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ABSTRACT
Burma is a country with a long history of rural co-operatives and 
with new trends in the co-operative movement. The trend has recently 
been to move from lower to higher stages of cooperation - from credit 
provision to marketing, and from marketing to farming activities. The 
latest development is in the field of co-operative farming which 
involves joint efforts in cultivation of land leading to pooling of 
cultivation rights and to group farming.
The major aim of this study is to see how agricultural
co-operatives have contributed to rural development in Burma, to 
examine the causes of failure and success of the agricultural
co-operative movement in the past, to review the present status of the 
movement, and to highlight ways and means that will encourage success 
in the future.
The co-operative movement was started in Burma in 1905, under 
British rule, to free the small cultivator from dependence on private 
money-lenders. Much was expected of the movement, but it was a failure 
and this seriously damaged the image of co-operatives.
After Burma regained its independence the Five Year Co-operative 
Plan was announced and agricultural co-operatives were formed to 
service its members with finance, to supply consumer goods and 
agricultural inputs, to sell produce and to promote thrift. Serious 
difficulties, including reliance on government loans, inefficiency 
compared to private traders and inadequate leadership, meant that most 
society did not serve their members well.
When the Revolutionary Council came to power, bogus societies were 
liquidated and efforts were made to form new socialist co-operatives as 
a mode of socialist ownership of means of production. The co-operative 
was regarded as the only socially-acceptable form of socializing 
small-scale producers, but most of the peasants were unwilling to pool 
their land. The Ministry of Co-operatives adopted the Pilot Project
Vfor Co-operative Fanning which emphasised establishing co-operative 
farms on cultivable waste land. The Pilot Project aimed to attract 
farmers through demonstration of the benefits of co-operative farming. 
Most co-operative farms, however, appear to have failed to take full 
advantage of their large scale and have experienced management 
disadvantages. The majority of land remains under individual private 
ownership and management and the small-holders are still economically 
dominant.
Co-operative farming is still in its infancy and has not taken 
firm root. Only state initiative and local leadership can give 
momentum to the movement. It has to rely on good management and new 
technology to achieve higher productivity and output in order to 
attract more farmers.
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1CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
Burma has a total area of 671,000 square kilometers (261,610
square miles). About two thirds of the country is in the Tropical Zone
and one third in the Temperate Zone. The major divisions are: the
Lower Delta, where rainfall averages about 100 inches a year; Central 
Burma, the Dry Zone, where rainfall is something less than 40 inches a 
year; Northern Burma, where rainfall is similar to that in the Lower 
Delta; the Shan Plateau in the east central area, with rainfall of 
about 60 inches a year; and the Arakan and Tenassarim coastal strips in 
the southwest and extreme southeast respectively, where the average 
annual rainfall reaches 200 inches (Walinski 1962, pp.3-4). The
Irrawaddy River runs from north to south the entire length of the 
country and enters the sea through a vast delta region. With this 
geographical background, Burma is predominantly an agricultural country 
and agriculture has traditionally been the main occupation of its 
people. The complex social system of the Burma village dates, by 
tradition, from the time of Anawrata (AD 1044-1077).
1.1 Village Life under the Burmese Kings
There is no doubt about the existence of a semi-feudal society in 
Burma under the Burmese Kings. But unlike the feudal society which 
existed in Europe or the caste system in India, the one in Burma was 
elastic in nature (Wai 1961, p.1). The system was based on the various 
'regiments' or elements of the royal army. Some villages were known as 
cavalry villages, while others were musketeer villages and so on, and 
everyone was supposed to belong to one such regiment. In any
particular village most of the people would usually belong to the same
2regiment, but there might also be people from other regiments living in 
the same village. Difference of classes did not prevent or restrict 
social relations and village life. Both men and women could pass from 
one class to another and the Burmese stratification of society did not 
result in the creation of a caste system (Andrus 1947, pp.11-13; 
Furnivall 1957, pp.29-35; Wai 1961, p.2).
Under the Burmese Kings, there was a vast amount of cultivable 
waste lands, and any person was allowed to clear and cultivate any land 
to which no occupant laid claim. Land tax had to be paid to the king, 
and was one-tenth of the produce, the payment being in kind. Thus 
anyone could get a clear title to that part of waste land he had 
cleared. Such land, held by the right of having been the first to clear 
it, was known as 'da-ma-u-gya' (right by first clearance). The Burmese 
agriculturalists were peasant proprietors. There was no distinction 
between landlord, cultivator, and labourer because the same man was all 
three at the same time, and there was absence of landlord-tenant 
relations throughout the country. A person established his right to 
occupy a particular piece of land by cultivating it; if he later 
abandoned the land, it reverted to the common land held by the village 
as a whole. If another cultivator chose to take it up, he could do so 
with or without the permission of its original occupant, depending on 
local custom (Adas 1974, p.28). Also, there were no guilds connected 
with trade as in Europe (Wai 1961, p.2).
Under the Burmese Kings, there was no certain market for any 
surplus produce, and export of rice was banned by the king. The policy 
of the Burmese Kings was very akin to the mercantilist philosophy (Wai 
1961, p.3). The cultivators practised subsistence farming and depended 
largely on mutual assistance. The basic unit of production was the 
family. The farmer rarely hired labour. If extra labour was required it 
was provided by neighbours, and co-operation was the key-note of 
agriculture in those days (Furnivall 1957, pp.29-30). Social life was 
governed by custom, which put social welfare above individual 
acquisitiveness, and it protected especially the right of the 
cultivator to the profits of his labour, and the possession of his land 
(Furnivall 1957, p.m). The traditional Burmese economic system did not 
provide for a type of private ownership of land that made it a freely
3exchangeable commodity, subject to mortgage and foreclosure proceedings 
(Andrus 1947, p.65).
The main aim of the cultivators was self-sufficiency and there was 
not a great need for credit. Agricultural indebtedness was unknown to 
the cultivators and there was no mortgaging of land. In fact, they 
needed little money since each household supplied its own requirements. 
In almost every house there was a loom for weaving and much of the 
cloth was spun at home. Only for their other household wants, did they 
depend on the market. The craftsmen of Burma catered to a considerable 
area, not to one village only. One village would specialize in 
pottery, for instance, more or less monopolising the market for several 
villages around. Exchange took place through a system of 
'five-day-bazaars', and exchanges were mostly by barter. Consumer 
goods imported into Burma were limited in quantity and quality and 
subject to heavy duty.
Thus the villagers' options as consumers were very limited. They 
were content with what they had, though their living standards were 
low. Andrus remarks:
The presence of rather extensive irrigation works, numerous 
village handicrafts, and a complicated social life, with its 
emphasis on co-operation, indicate that it is a mistake to 
regard the pre-British Burmese economy as primitive and 
uncivilized. In many respects it may be compared with the 
medieval period in Europe (1947, p.11).
In summary, under the Burmese Kings, the economy was not
developed, resources were underutilized, and cultivation extended very 
slowly to meet the needs of a slowly expanding population.
Agriculturalists were peasant proprietors and enjoyed a low but 
adequate standard of living.
1.2 Village Life under British Rule
The British annexed Burma in three stages: some coastal regions
in 1824-1826, the whole of the Lower Delta in 1852, and finally the 
entire country in 1885. Following the British conquest, the political 
and economic institutions of Burma were transformed. The whole country 
was rapidly drawn into a capitalistic, commercially-oriented global 
economy. Political and economic changes led to the emergence of a new
4society which was radically different from the old one. In fact, after 
Lower Burma was annexed, the British made efforts to transform domestic 
agriculture into commercial agriculture.
The British were well aware of Lower Burma's potential as a 
rice-growing area. But they found the area sparsely populated and 
undeveloped. The Irrawaddy Delta was covered with swamp and jungle. 
Therefore the British looked to two sources of labour supply: Upper 
Burma and India. They lifted the ban on rice exports and encouraged the 
expansion of cultivation. Burmese cultivators responded to the 
incentives and migrants from Upper Burma settled upon the land and 
cleared the jungle. Development of commercial agriculture encouraged 
cultivators to take up more land than they could cultivate with their 
own family. There arose a demand for hired labour. Indian immigrants 
came on a seasonal basis to plant, reap, and mill the crop. Among the 
Indian immigrants Chettyars, unlike the others, played a different role 
in commercial rice cultivation of Burma, as money- lenders. They were a 
caste of hereditary money-lenders from Madras.
By and large, the capital requirements to start a successful farm 
were far beyond the means of the average Burmese migrants. They needed 
more money than before. The British government established facilities 
to provide credit for agriculturalists. Under the Land Improvement 
Loans Act of 1883, and the Agricultural Loans Act of 1884, funds were 
made available to cultivators at an interest rate of 5 percent per 
year. Nevertheless, the cultivators could obtain only limited amounts 
of capital usually after considerable inconvenience and delay. They had 
to turn to the Chettyars. Burmese money-lenders developed at a later 
stage, but never accumulated as much capital as the Chettyars. Since 
the beginning of commercial agriculture the Chettyars played a dominant 
role in the provision of credit. In the 1880s agents of Chettyar firms 
began to fan out over the Delta from Rangoon and other urban centers 
(Adas 1974, p.67).
The typical Burmese farmer had no knowledge of the intricacies of 
finance, or of the Western judicial system. He knew only that he needed 
money for cultivation and did not worry about the precise legal terms 
in the document which he must sign to get money. The interest rates on 
land mortgages were normally 15 to 36 percent per annum (Andrus 1947, 
p.76) and the cultivators were led into chronic indebtedness.
5On the other hand, because of their greater involvement in paddy 
production for the market, cultivators had become dependent upon others 
for goods and services. They had to purchase firewood, bamboo, and 
thatch as neighbouring forests were depleted, or claimed by the 
government or private owners. European merchants purchased most of the 
surplus rice and imported consumer goods as incentives for Burmese 
cultivators to produce large surpluses. There was a spreading of 
foreign consumer goods among Burmese agriculturalists. European and 
Indian textiles and cheap consumer items like canned milk, sardines, 
soap, and European glassware or crockery were found in almost all the 
villages. Andrus points out that foodstuffs and common household 
necessities were acquired ordinarily on credit from Indian and Chinese 
retailers (1947, p.198). Under this system, six baskets of paddy had to 
be paid at harvest time for one basket of rice purchased at the shop. 
Thus the actual interest rate was several hundred percent per annum. 
Still another disadvantage of this type of shop and credit system was 
the fact that prices were higher than elsewhere, as the shopkeeper had 
a monopoly position in the supply of goods to villagers who were unable 
to pay cash (Andrus 1947, p.199; Adas 1974, p.65).
Thus the agriculturalists became more and more deeply indebted and 
this chronic indebtedness eventually led to the alienation of the 
debtor's land, most land passing into the hands of non­
agriculturalists. The great majority of non-agriculturalist landlords 
were money-lenders, paddy brokers, and village shopkeepers. In 1937 50 
percent of agricultural lands in thirteen principal rice-growing 
districts of Lower Burma was occupied by non-agriculturalists. In Upper 
Burma, 14 percent of agricultural land was occupied by non­
agriculturalists. For Burma as a whole, the figure stood at 33.6 
percent, of which 7.4 percent consisted of resident non­
agriculturalists and the remaining 26.2 percent were absentee landlords 
(Myint 1971, pp.82-84; Andrus 1947, pp.69-70). In addition to the land 
owned by non-agriculturalists, a large percentage of land still held in 
farmers' names was so heavily mortgaged that their occupants were 
reduced to the status of tenants. The only difference was that
interest, instead of rent, was being paid to the non-agriculturists 
(Furnivall 1957, p.62; Myint 1971, p.82). Hence, Andrus comments: 'It
6is doubtful if more than 15 percent of land of Lower Burma was, by 
1941, owned by genuine agriculturalists, and unmortgaged (1947, p.81)'.
In the colonial period, Burmese industry and international trade 
was monopolised by Europeans , domestic and foreign commerce by Indians 
and Chinese, and the native Burmese confined to agriculture. They
barely participated in the economic progress of the country and their 
conditions became worse than before. Peasant proprietorship ceased to 
be typical of agriculture. Although the policy of the British 
government was to create a class of peasant proprietors, it failed (Wai 
1961, p.60), and the change from domestic to commercial agriculture 
generated new relations between landowners, tenants and labourers.
Although numerous large estates grew up there was very little
large-scale agriculture in Burma; the typical unit of cultivation was 
fifteen to thirty acres. Thus the large landlord dealt with a large 
number of tenants, each of whom worked independently of the others. On 
the other hand, the population dependent on agriculture was increasing 
year after year. Even though 4,879,490 people, who constituted 60.2 
percent of the total population, were dependent on agriculture in 1891,
the number of such people amounted to 9,158,932 in 1931, accounting for
70 percent of total population (Wai 1961, p.96). As the extension of 
cultivated acreage slowed down, supply of labour rose at a faster rate 
than the demand, and the percentage of the total output from rented 
lands demanded by landlords rose sharply. By the mid-1920s rent 
averaged as high as 40 or 50 percent of the gross output (Adas 1974, 
p.148). Rent rates once determined by custom were fixed by contract 
before the ploughing season. Moreover, whether written or verbal, 
contracts were almost always for only one year, and landlords annually 
auctioned the cultivation rights of their land to the highest bidder. 
As a consequence, 50 percent of tenants in Lower Burma were changing 
holdings each year in the closing decade of the colonial era (Myint 
1971, p.85). Tenancy was insecure and inter-village mobility was high.
In most areas of the delta, social and economic distinctions 
between tenants and landless labourers became increasingly blurred. 
The numbers of landless labourers were increased by cultivator-owners 
who lost their land and by tenants who were outbid for the holdings 
they rented. Greater competition had the same adverse effects on the
7living standard and working conditions of landless labourers as it had 
on those of tenants. Labourers' wages declined continuously, and by 
the 1920s the combined efforts and the salaries of all adult members of 
a labourer's household were often not sufficient to meet rising living 
costs (Adas 1974, p.153). Scxne migrated to urban areas to find
employment, while others turned to crime, and the number of Burmese 
decoits and petty thieves increased as the agrarian crisis grew more 
severe.
The village, traditionally a tightly-knit unit integrated by 
social customs, became little more than an administrative unit. 
Unemployed agriculturalists wandered about the area in search of 
part-time employment or abandoned holdings to cultivate. The constant 
migration from village to village broke down the Burmese social system, 
economic forces dissolved the villages into individuals, and
co-operation among the agriculturists became weakened. This growing 
class of landless, homeless cultivators was one of the main sources of 
increases in robbery and other crimes (Andrus 1947, p.71; Furnivall
1957, p.81; Adas 1974, p.192). The Saya San Rebellion, which broke out 
at the end of 1930, was mainly based on agrarian discontent over debt 
and tax burdens. Thus, under British rule, there had been ' economic 
progress' in Burma, and Burma became a rice exporting country, but 
rural people had been neglected and left behind. They were eking out 
an insecure and inadequate living in a country which was the world's 
largest rice exporter. Agricultural indebtedness, land alienation, and 
tenancy were serious agrarian problems to solve when Burma regained its 
independence. And, naturally, co-operative organizations were looked 
upon as one kind of solution to these problems.
8CHAPTER 2
RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND CO-OPERATIVES
Nowadays all developing countries are making efforts to achieve 
sustained economic growth. Most of their people are still living in 
rural areas and remain poor. Although there have been rapid rates of 
growth of GNP in many developing countries, a very large proportion of 
their people have not shared in the benefits. Rapid growth in GNP has 
often been accompanied by a more unequal income distribution and 
increasing relative and, in some cases, absolute impoverishment of 
sections of the community (Stewart and Streeten 1980, p.390). Growth
is not reaching the poor and the poor are not contributing to growth. 
Therefore, rural development necessarily becomes a historical mission 
of the developing countries. International institutions such as the 
World Bank, the FAO, and the ILO of the United Nations have also put 
greater emphasis on the need for rural development.
2.1 The Meaning and the Objectives of Rural Development
Rural development, as defined by the World Bank, is a strategy 
designed to improve the economic and social life of a specific group of 
people - the rural poor. It involves extending the benefits of 
development to the poorest among those who seek a livelihood in the 
rural areas. The group includes small-scale farmers, tenants, and the 
landless (World Bank 1975, p.3). Barlow and Richter regard rural
development 'as that wide complex of activities associated with not 
only raising total productivity and profits, but also with bringing the 
benefits of these increases to a wide section of the population, 70 
percent or more of whom usually live in country areas and are very 
poor' (Barlow and Richter 1983, p.1). According to Lele, 'rural
9development is defined as improving living standards of the mass of the 
low income population residing in rural areas and making the process of 
t^e^r development self-sustaining' (Lele 1976/ p.257).
The phrase 'integrated rural development' is also used by some 
authors to bring out wider meanings and objectives. According to Lea 
and Chaudhri, this phrase was coined for those situations where 
planning objectives have some or all of the following interrelated 
goals in common:
1. To improve the living standards or 'well-being' of the mass 
of the people by ensuring that thev h^ve ecurity and that 
their basic needs such as food shelter, clothing, and 
employment are met.
2. To make rural areas more productive and less vulnerable to 
natural hazards, poverty and exploitation and to give them a 
mutually beneficial relationship with other parts of the 
regional national and international economy.
3. To ensure that any development is self-sustaining and 
involves the mass of the people (this involves among other 
things encouraging self-reliance and public participation in 
planning).
4. To ensure as much local autonomy and as little disruption to 
traditional custom as possible. The former usually means 
promoting administrative decentralization and political 
self-government (Lea and Chaudhri 1983, pp.12-13).
These objectives are concerned with many different and 
interrelated aspects of rural life; thus rural development is no longer 
solely concerned with agricultural matters. Various international 
agencies and institutions dealing with development emphasise some or 
all of the following as important elements of rural development:
1. Increased output and productivity of the rural sector
2. Increased employment in the rural sector
3. Reduced income inequality in the rural sector
4. Increased participation of the poor in economic activity and 
decision making (Chaudhri 1983, p.12).
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2.2 Rural Development Strategies
However, there are different approaches to development objectives 
Stewart and Streeten (1980, pp.390-411) discuss four strategies for 
development. These are: the high growth and trickle down strategy; t>e 
radical redistribution strategy; the incremental redistribution 
strategy; and th® redistribution through growth strategy.
The strategy of high growth and trickle down is the strategy that 
was generally followed in the 1950s and 1960s and aims at optimization 
of GNP growth. The strategy was ba-ed on the assumption that without 
any active intervention of government hig^ growth of GNP would 
automatically raise the levels of living of the poor through a
trickle-down mechanism. But, in many countries, poverty and
unemployment have been increasing with growing GNP. Stewart and 
Strreeten argue that most governments' polices continue to be 
predominantly protective of the haves and hostile to the have-nots
(1980, p.398). Experience shows that this strategy aggravates rather
than eliminates inequality and poverty. The trickle down policy almost 
certainly failed because those who benefited from high growth did not 
wish to divert their gains to those who did not (Stewart and Streeten 
1980, p .402) .
The radical redistribution strategy is a policy of redistributing 
existing assets. It includes policies of land reform and wider spread 
of ownership or nationalization of industrial property. It also 
includes radical reforms of institutions to give to the poor greater 
access to educational and health services, to credit and to technology. 
Redistribution of incomes automatically follows redistribution of 
assets.
Incremental redistribution involves taxing the better-off to 
redistribute to the worse-off. This has been the policy of democratic 
socialist regimes for a long time. It has rarely had marked effects on 
the distribution of income because redistribution is marginal and if it 
threatens to become non-marginal it is resisted. Believing that 
resistance stems from people's dislike of having their absolute income 
levels cut. the latest version of incremental redistribution is 
redistribution with growth, aiming at raising the growth rate of the 
incomes of the poor. This policy involves taking the extra incomes that
would accrue to the better-off and redistributing it to the poor. The 
redistribution would take the form of providing investment resources to 
the poor. But Stewart and Streeten (1980. p.402) argue that the bias of 
technological advance has made it almost entirely impossible. Besides, 
if redistribution is to occur from extra -incomes, the extent of the 
possible redistribution will be limited by the growth in incomes. This 
policy may also be as unrealistic in practice as the trickle-down 
policy.
According to Stewart and Streeten (1980, p.403) the different
strategies to eradicate poverty and reduce inequalities can also be 
broadly classified into three schools of thought. They are the Price 
Mechanists, the Radicals, and the Technologists. We can add another 
school, the Reformists(Griffin 1974, pp.199-201; Lea and Chaudhri 1984, 
pp.18-25).
The Price Mechanists argue that low production, low productivity, 
inequality and unemployment can be eliminated by setting the correct 
prices, which serve both as signals and as incentives. They heavily 
emphasize price policy as the basic element of a strategy of rural 
development. The Radicals believe that what matters is the 
redistribution of assets power, and access to income-earning 
opportunities. Thus they place emphasis on structural and institutional 
reforms as the basis for rural development. The Technologists claim 
that neither prices and incentives nor 'structural changes' can solve a 
problem where appropriate technical solutions do not exist. They 
heavily emphasize technology in rural development.
According to Stewart and Streeten (1980, pp.403-408), the Price 
Mechanists or the Radicals or the Technologists by themselves may move 
society away from the desired goal. They assert that 'only a 
three-pronged attack combining, signals and incentives, institutional 
reforms directed at the redistribution of assets (including access to 
education) and technical and institutional innovation, promises 
results' (Stewart and Streeten 1980 p.407). The Reformists attempt to
combine the, presumably, ideal features of all the three types. A 
reformist strategy has to emphasize a careful orchestration of all 
elements, but redistributive land reform would be a precondition for 
success of such a strategy (Lea and Chaudhri 1983, p.20). However
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reformist governments tend to vacillate in their choice of policies, 
and we frequently encounter inconsistencies between what a government 
proclaims and what it actually does (Griffin 1974, p.201). Quite often 
the reforms are partial, fragmented and incomplete. Although the 
reformist governments seem to provide a three-pronged attack, in 
practice the results do not follow. In practice, it may be difficult 
to combine three strategies. At certain stages of development, it may 
be necessary to place more emphasis on a particular strategy and to 
change it as conditions change. In fact. most rural development 
strategies are in a process of continual change.
It would also be possible to classify strategies on a different 
basis, such as uni-modal and bi-modal. Nevertheless, we choose not to 
do so because we wish to trace the intended beneficiaries and land 
tenure institutions of agrarian policies. The radical strategy brings 
benefits to small peasants and landless labourers through collectives, 
communes, and state farms. The Reformist strategy tends to benefit 
middle peasants and progressive farmers through co-operatives and 
family farms. Technocratic and free market determined strategies tend 
to benefit land-owning elites and large farmers through large estates 
and owner-operated large farms respectively.
With respect to rural development strategy, Barraclough comments:
If we are really serious about wanting to encourage 
development policies that benefit the low-income rural classes, 
a great deal more attention must be ’-'aid to analysis of social 
structures and political processes.... This problem is not going 
to be solved merely by greater investments in technological 
improvements of the ' green revolution' or bv more abundant 
credit and technical assistance. Rural development for the 
low-income majorities requires fundamental and often
revolutionary reforms in social institutions (1976, p.104).
Griffin also points out, as regards the promise of the green 
revolution, that 'unless governments pursue a radical or at least 
reformist strategy, the "green revolution" tends to increase economic 
inequality and this, in turn, may aggravate social conflicts which 
already exist' (1974, pp.209-210). In criticizing the Technologists, 
Stewart and Streeten (1980, p.407) argue that 'as the "green
revolution" has shown, if the distribution of assets like water, 
fertilizers and credit is concentrated, it is the larger farmers with
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controlled water supply who benefit, in some cases at the expense of 
small farmers and landless labourers'. In the Philippines, which 
follows the technocratic strategy, the spread of the new high-yielding 
varieties like IR-8 has been accompanied by the emergence of a new 
class of commercial rice farmers who had been landlords. a change which 
has often involved the ejection of tenants working on the lands 
concerned (Ishikawa 1970, pp.25-62).
If we accept the radical and reformist strategies then
co-operatives and collectives are required- The technocratic model 
accepts co-operatives only as marketing societies. But co-operatives 
are more often formed for political, social and economic reasons, and 
many aspects of rural life can be promoted through co-operatives since 
they are socioeconomic organizations. Co-operative societies are 
playing an increasinglv important role in the economic life of many 
countries.
2.3 Co-operative Organizations
Among the various organizations that can contribute to rural 
development, co-operatives have certain distinguishing characteristics. 
The word 'co-operation' in general use means collaborating or working 
together. But an informal gro'in of farmers collaborating to harvest 
their crops is not a co-operative, although it may be the seed of one. 
Some examples of common working by farmers are found in every country, 
but usually these come under the heading of neighbourly help, rather 
than formal co-operation. However, it is difficult to find a universal 
definition of a co-operative society. The definition of a co-operative 
societv and the principles that should govern its organization and 
operation have always been, and still are, the subject of heated 
debates (Helm 1968, p.3). Perhaps the best attempt to define a 
co-operative was made by the ILO:
A Co-operative is an association of persons, usually of 
limited m°ans, who have voluntarily joined together to achieve 
a common economic end through the formation of a 
democratically-controlled business organization, making 
equitable contributions to the capital required and accepting a 
fair share of the risks and benefits of the undertaking 
(Youngjohns 1976, p.233).
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In short, co-operatives differ from other types of voluntary 
associations in that they are business organizations. They differ from 
private enterprises in their forms of ownership, control and in the 
manner of distributing profits. The ILO held that the establishment 
and growth of co-operatives should be regarded as one of the important 
instruments for economic, social and cultural, as well as human 
advancement in developing countries (Chinchankar and Namjoshi 1977, 
p. 1 1 ) . In fact, co-operation is not an end in itself but a means to 
certain goals.
Agricultural co-operatives are voluntary organizations serving the 
purpose of promoting t^e economic interests of the members by mutual 
help and common enterprise. The management is based on democratic 
control, and the principles of self-help, self-administration and 
self-responsibility, as well as the equal rights of members, are 
practised. Opinions as to what the goal should be and how it should be 
achieved are different in different countries. There are three main 
schools of thought in this respect: the co-operative enterprise or the
co-operative yardstick school; the co-operative commonwealth school; 
and the socialist co-operative school (Helm 1968, pp.3-5).
Since there are different schools of thought there is some 
controversy as to which form of agricultural co-operation is suitable 
for small holders. The primary obejective of the co-operative 
enterprise school is 'the advancement of the members' economic
interests, and protecting and maintaining the economic independence of 
the small entrepreneur and farmers by balancing economic weakness 
through pooling of resources, and thus achieving economies of scale' 
(Helm 1968, p.4). This school sees as its main aim the supporting of 
the individual efforts as far as possible through a variety of 
services. The co-operative commonwealth school of thought is not 
satisfied with improving the members' economic position within the 
existing economic system. This school wants, 'as a long term objective, 
to eliminate the competitive, capitalist system and replace it by an 
economic svstem based on mutual co-operation' (Helm 1968, p.4). While 
this school of thought wants a human society based on cooperation as 
their ultimate aim. the socialist school of thought accepts 
co-operatives as a stepping-stone to socialist society. The socialist
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co-operative school is the most recent school of thought. According to 
this school, co-operatives can be an important step in socialist 
progress. In socialist countries the co-operative movement is a means 
of socializing small-scale production and services (Lange 1970, 
pp.443-456). This school aims at collectivizing agriculture.
We can broadlv distinguish between two main types of agricultural 
co-operatives. The rural co-operatives of the usual type may be defined 
as classical service co-operatives, providing economic services to 
their members in such fields as credit, supply. marketing and 
processing. The service co-operative may work as a single or 
multi-purpose society. These service co-operatives usually do not 
enter the field of agricultural production, and are confined to the 
external processes of farm enterprises. The second type of
co-operative includes those with activities directly in the sphere of 
agricultural production; these are known as agricultural production 
co-operatives. Production co-operatives carry out the processes of 
farming and animal husbandary in common.
A farmer joining a production co-operative must usually give up 
his independence as the holder of a farm and prepare to change entirely 
his manner of work. It would be, therefore, wrong to assume that 
gradual intensification of co-operatives alone would automatically 
result in the transition from service co-operatives to production 
co-operatives. Smith (1961, p.42) and Galeski (1977, p.28) point out 
that spontaneous tranformation of simple forms of co-operation into 
co-operative farms has never been observed- Even though service 
co-operatives do not transform automatically into co-operative farms, 
Schiller (1969, p.6) states that in recent times some classical service 
co-operatives have'been taking up functions directly in the sphere of 
production. Galeski (1977, pp.32-33) also points to this trend. It is 
an intermediary form between the agricultural production co-operative 
and the rural service co-operative. In such societies, co-operative 
activity in farming and husbandary is - unlike the production 
co-operative - combined with the individual use of land. Member-farms 
are maintained in those societies, whereas member-farms either do not 
exist from the beginning or disappear by amalgamation into a bigger 
farming unit in the production co-operative. However, this type of
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fanning can be described as a variation of co-operative fanning in its 
comprehensive sense.
2.4 Services Provided by Co-operatives
Agricultural co-operatives can be classified according to their 
main functions. However, the contribution of co-operatives to rural 
development can be viewed either through the services they provide or 
through their direct activities in agricultural production. We shall 
first view different services provided by co-operatives.
2.4.1 Co-operative credit
The provision of credit in agriculture is one of the oldest known 
forms of co-operation. Of all the services which voluntary co-operative 
associations have undertaken for their farmer members, that of 
obtaining and administering credit is, in most countries, the one that 
they have carried out best (United Nations 1954, p.37). In many
countries, the absence of co-operative credit would leave farmers at 
the mercy of local money-lenders. Farmers can also help one another by 
mobilising their savings. But in many of the developing countries of 
Asia, the proportion of overall credit needs of the farmers provided 
through co-operatives is often less than 15 percent (Singh 1966, p.44).
2.4.2 Co-operative marketing
One of the most effective ways of promoting rural development is 
through the reorganization of rural produce markets. By and large, most 
marketing activities have arisen in response to low prices for farm 
products, wide marketing margins, excessive transportation costs, and 
in general, a lack of farmers' bargaining power. But the experiences of 
many countries illustrate how difficult it is to achieve sound 
co-operative marketing societies while farmers remain indebted to local 
merchant money-lenders.
2.4.3 Co-operative purchasing and supplying goods and services
With the development of commercialization in agriculture farmers 
become increasingly dependent upon outside supplies. Substantial 
reductions in the prices charged to farmers and their families for the 
goods and services they buy are important.
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If charges for fertilizers, improved tools, machinery and 
other factors of production remain high, the full effects of 
other policies favourable to increasing farm production and 
rural prosperity can not be achieved. Nor is the greatest 
possible prosperity achieved if consumer goods and services are 
not efficiently distributed (United Nations 1954, p.52).
In some developing countries, governments have relied heavily on 
the co-operative movement to ensure fair distribution of scarce goods 
and services.
2.4.4 Technical knowledge
Agricultural production largely depends on technical knowledge, 
and it is important to disseminate this knowlege among the farmers. 
Agricultural co-operatives are one of the means through which technical 
knowledge can be disseminated and from which problems for research can 
arise. Many co-operatives have advanced the adoption of new technical 
knowledge, but it is not customary for co-operatives in most developing 
countries to employ extension workers.
2.4.5 Health and education
Co-operative societies can contribute to rural health in several 
ways. Co-operatives can be formed to improve water supplies, 
sanitation and general hygiene of villages, and some societies also 
provide first-aid centres and dispensaries. In addition, many 
co-operatives have provided educational assistance to the children of 
members and have furthered progress in adult education.
2.5 Co-operative Agricultural Production
In most developing countries the agrarian structure is 
characterised by the prevalence of small farming units. So far as 
agriculture benefits from economies of scale, cooperation between small 
farmers and their integration into higher forms of organization seems 
to be a prerequisite for a progressive development of agriculture. 
Production co-operatives are the most complex type of co-operative to 
organize, as they involve the joint use of land and implements in 
production, and aim to expand the earnings of a common farm to which 
the members usually contribute their labour. Fundamental political 
decisions generally need to be made before such co-operatives can be
18
successfully formed. Co-operative farming and joint use of land is an 
important question in the agrarian policies of many developing
countries. In fact, collective forms of organization in agricultural 
production are characteristic features of the agrarian system of 
communist countries. But agricultural production co-operatives
pre-date modern communist societies. The concept of the co-operative 
use of land goes back to the ideals of Fourier ( 1772-1837) and Owen 
(1771-1858) (Helm 1968, p . 111 ) . In some countries such as Israel,
examples of agricultural production co-operatives existed before the 
October Revolution of 1917 in Russia.
An important alternative to a peasant small-holder system is that 
of collective, co-operative, or state farms. According to Dorner and 
Kanel (1977, p.3), the question of the kind of economic organization to 
establish in farming is not a purely economic issue. Although this
issue inevitably arises if a country embarks on a large-scale land
reform, political and ideological factors will probably play a key role 
in determining the outcome (Dorner and Kanel 1977, p.3). Goyal (1966, 
p.104) makes the same point in viewing the Chinese experience, and 
Galeski (1977, p.20) points out that it is nearly impossible to analyse
organizational differences, or economic and social consequences of
collective farms, without taking into account the goal of the
particular organization. According to him, certain criteria of an
economic analysis could be quite meaningless for a collective's members 
if they created it in order to reach some religious, moral, or social 
goal. He gives the example of kolkhozes in Russia. The organizational 
principles of kolkhozes would be considered absurd in a non-planned 
economy, but they are not so absurd if it is recognized that the 
kolkhoze is a form which allows for surplus extraction from agriculture 
for use in extensive industrialization of the country (Galeski, 1977, 
p.20). Smith also notes that it is wrong to judge all co-operative or 
collective farms by an economic standard (1961, p.34). But Schiller 
argues that the question is to what extent, by adequate 
socio-organizational measures, can a prompt improvement of agricultural 
techniques and a corresponding increase of agricultural production be 
achieved (1969, p.viii). In fact, since co-operative/collective farms 
are economic organizations established to achieve certain social or
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political goals we shall have to take into account both its goals and 
its contribution to agricultural productivity.
2.6 Arguments Against Co-operative Farming
Even though most countries have accepted that co-operation in many 
aspects of economic life is necessary and should be promoted, 
co-operative farming has not received pure praise. The opponents of 
co-operative farming generally regard private ownership of land and 
personal management of land as keys to the development of agriculture. 
According to them, farmers are sentimentally attached to their lands 
and only through coercion and force can people be herded into 
co-operative farms. If we sort out the detailed arguments against 
co-operative farming and reorganize them, it is possible to sum them up 
as follows:
1. In agriculture the scope for division of labour is limited 
and the economies of large scale are very difficult to 
attain, while the diseconomies are compelling. Large-scale 
farming, which a co-operative farming organization implies, 
would therefore not pay. Co-operative farming does not 
confer any special advantage compared with small peasant 
farms. Much recent work has shown that small farms (in some 
circumstances) are very efficient, for instance, in Japan 
and Taiwan.
2. Even if there were some economies in a co-operative farm, 
the increasing inefficiency of the human factor (quality of 
labour and management) would effectively offset such 
economies. People would not work on a co-operative farm as 
they would on a private farm. Managerial and supervisory 
costs of co-operative farms would be much higher than those 
of family farms. Co-operative farms may not succeed for 
lack of trained personnel. The farmer's status would be 
reduced from being self-employed to being a wage earner.
3. Co-operative farming would further aggravate the problem of 
unemployment already facing developing countries since it 
involves mechanization of farms.
4. The transition from family farming to co-operative farming 
involves coercion and force, which is possible only in a 
dictatorial and totalitarian set-up. Co-operative farming 
is then undemocratic and involuntary.
5. Co-operative farms are instruments of unduly high tax 
collection and compulsory grain deliveries (Khusro and 
Agarwal 1961, pp.43-48; Goyal 1966, pp.177-180; Chinchankar 
1977, pp.230-232 ) .
In some economic and political circumstances these drawbacks of
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collective farming are very real. For instance, enforced 
collectivization caused a drop in Russia's food output. Nevertheless, 
some objections need to be viewed in a proper perspective, and most 
objections are not inherent and permanent characteristics of 
co-operative farming. In fact, a number of countries are experimenting 
with group farming or production co-operatives in an effort to overcome 
the problems of the family farming system.
2.7 Arguments Against Family Farming
The advantages of a family farm system, such as a large measure of 
freedom and independence, pride of ownership, willingness to invest in 
improvements, and close and intimate supervision, are well known. But 
this system also has defects in poor countries with large rural 
populations. In such countries the farmers have to work on small plots 
and the incomes of farm families are low relative to their needs and 
wants. They have to borrow too much from money-lenders and they may 
gradually fall into debt slavery. Ownership then becomes quite insecure 
and the incentives to better farming ineffective (United Nations 1954, 
p.20). Thus it permits undue concentration of ownership of land and
often turns small owners into tenants or labourers. Moreover, for the 
sake of satisfying immediate and pressing wants, maintenance of soil 
fertility and full conservation of other resources may be sacrificed. 
Poor farmers are generally unable or unwilling to make the savings and 
investments necessary for good conservation. Furthermore, with
increasing population and laws of inheritence that result in
subdivision of properties, fragmentation of holdings has been the 
natural tendency of family farm systems. There are many countries in 
which a large proportion of farms are too small to provide a
subsistence minimum for the cultivator and his family, or to provide
them with full employment, and too small also to permit of any 
improvement in methods of cultivation (United Nations 1951, p.6). Even 
Western liberal thinkers such as Myrdal accept that small family farms 
are not particularly suitable for certain output-raising innovations 
such as irrigation works and the economic use of animal and tractor 
power (Sinha 1976, p.57). Another defect of owner-occupancy in many
countries is that disputes about ownership can be costly and disruptive
(United Nations 1954, p.26).
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From the standpoint of development issues, Dorner and Kanel (1977) 
also point out two major drawbacks of the family farm system. First, a 
highly productive family farm system requires an elaborate service 
structure, such as research and extension services, which is both 
expensive and time-consuming to develop. Second, a family farm system 
can allow great inequalities to develop. These may be a function of 
variations in individual entrepreneurial abilities or initial 
endowments of land. Whatever their cause, they can accumulate over time 
and present serious obstacles to achieving a resolution of some of the 
problems of development (Dorner and Kanel 1977, pp.4-5). A government 
can not deal effectively with such a system until all the necessary 
infrastructure is in place and markets have begun to function 
competitively (Dorner and Kanel 1977, p.5).
2.8 Advantages of Co-operative Farms over Family Farms
The defects of the family farm system are often obstacles to 
agrarian development in developing countries. Some Western social 
scientists already acknowledge that group agriculture is a realistic 
possibility for rendering agriculture more meaningful in many 
underdeveloped countries (Sinha 1976, p.64). We now discuss some of the 
advantages of co-operative farms over family farms, before turning to 
some of the disadvantages.
2.8.1 Consolidation of fragmented lands
In most developing countries, farmers' holdings are subdivided and 
fragmented into various plots scattered over large areas. When holders 
of land decide to merge their holdings into a co-operative farm 
boundaries become unnecessary. Consolidation of farms reduces exertion 
and cost. In addition, consolidation makes more land available by 
abolishing the strips of land that need to be left between one fragment 
and another (Khusro and Agarwal 1961, p.63). More land means more 
employment. Also, a large collective unit can be more flexible than a 
small one in adapting its land-use patterns to fit variations in soil 
and topography (Dorner and Kanel 1977, p.6). Likewise, a large unit may 
have an advantage over a large number of small farms in certain types 
of infrastructural investments, such as a drainage system (Dorner and 
Kanel 1977, p.6).
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2.8.2 Greater possibilities of reclamation
The second source of additional land and additional employment is 
reclamation of lands. There are still cultivable waste lands in most 
developing countries, but land reclamation generally requires a great 
deal of capital and labour, and individual farmers do not have adequate 
resources to reclaim these lands. A co-operative organization would 
generally have larger money resources as well as labour resources. It 
can be argued that a government organization may reclaim the waste 
lands and then hand these over to private farmers. But this argument 
can be questioned from the viewpoint of costs, particularly when waste 
lands are very widely scattered over the country (Khusro and Agarwal 
1961, p.65). However, land reclamation and settlement is often the 
basis of co-operative farming in many countries.
2.8.3 Reducing average fixed cost
Under the family farm system, most fixed capital, such as draught 
cattle, is underutilized, since the size of holdings is too small to 
keep them fully employed. This means that the capacities of fixed 
capital are being wasted and their cost is high per unit of output. On 
a large farm, it would be possible to employ fixed capital more fully 
and the average fixed cost per unit of output would be lower. But 
after a certain size has been reached every addition to size would lead 
to diseconomies of scale, and it is a question of discovering the 
optimum size. However, a large unit would be able to employ fixed 
capital more fully than a small one.
2.8.4 Mobilisation of labour and capital
Under the family farming system, surplus resources such as labour 
are in small quantities and are scattered in time and space. These 
surplus resources remain unnoticed and unused because they cannot bring 
any substantial improvement and cannot be mobilized. When co-operative 
farms are formed it becomes possible for the co-operative unit, 
collectively, to take up such work as improving roads, land and 
irrigation. This is not surprising since collective action and 
individual benefit become more closely and more directly aligned as 
holdings of land and other assets become more nearly equal (IBRD 1984, 
p.88). Furthermore, as Khursro and Agarwal (1961, pp.57-59) have
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observed, the mobilisation of capital and labour under an organization 
enables it to reduce the gestation period of investment projects. 
Labour is the most plentiful and cheapest resources available in low 
income countries while capital is scarce and expensive. Using the 
rural workforce for infrastructure improvement is an important means of 
converting labour into capital (IBRD 1984, p.88).
2.8.5 Realisation of social goals
In pursuing the development of co-operative farming, policy-makers 
generally aim at the realisation of several social and economic goals. 
In the social sphere, the main general objectives are the improvement 
of the social and economic condition of small and middle farmers and 
landless labourers. Co-operative farms are likely to bring about more 
equal income distribution and employment opportunities. Moreover, 
democratic management of co-operative farms helps to promote leadership 
at the grass root level. But much will depend on the nature of 
participation of individuals in the decision making process (Dorner and 
Kanel 1977, p.7).
2.8.6 Government's effective control
The government can develop more effective and direct contact with 
farmers in co-operative farming. Certainly it is easier for a 
government to provide services of all kinds - credit, inputs, 
extension, marketing etc.- to a small number of co-operatives than to a 
large number of small farmers. The government can also obtain greater 
control over agricultural production for fulfilling plan targets. 
Governments in the majority of developing countries regard 
co-operatives as an instrument for the implementation of official 
economic plans. Co-operative farms can facilitate grain purchases by 
the government.
2.8.7 Introducing modern farm management systems
Small farmers in the developing countries usually keep no records 
and generally rely on their memories to manage their farms. On 
co-operative farms, modern farm management can more easily be 
introduced and farm management accounting systems can be used, budgets 
can be prepared and detailed records kept, making it easier to predict 
future production trends, price trends, and cycles. While this would
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reduce risks and uncertainties to some extent, it would also require 
more trained personnel.
2.8.8 Mechanization and productivity
It is normally true that mechanization of agriculture can 
aggravate unemployment in developing countries. But, according to 
Bicanic (1964, p.179), technological policy has two effects, one
substitutive and the other additive. The first means that human labour 
is replaced by capital, and also that animal capital is replaced by 
mechanical traction. The second effect is the additive one, increasing 
the production forces capable of doing better, heavier, and faster work 
in agriculture. Moreover, Dorner and Kanel (1977, p.6) argue that 'with 
group farming, farm workers gain greater control over the type of 
technology that will be used, and they are more likely to preserve 
employment opportunities for themselves and their children'. Therefore, 
it could be hoped that co-operative farms would stress the additive
effects, and the use of machinery might improve the intensity of 
cultivation and increase labour use. Even if unemployment is brought
about by mechanization it may be applied to numerous neglected
activities in agriculture, such as land improvement and irrigation.
As regards co-operative mechanization, tractors have generally 
been classified as labour-saving. But Raj (1973, p.113) points out
that 'tractors could be land-saving either because they till the soil 
more deeply or because bottlenecks imposed by time are broken by
greater speed of operations' (cited by Booth and Sundrum, forthcoming). 
In addition, increasing returns to scale were found to be operating in 
some selected areas of India (Krishnaswami 1977, p.46), and inverse
relationship found under the traditional, labour-intensive technology, 
does not seem to hold good in areas undergoing technological change 
(Booth and Sundrum, forthcoming).
As regards the efficiency advantage of a small farm over large 
farm, Berry and Cline (1979, p.134) note that the special efficiency 
advantages of small farms tend to disappear when the opportunity cost 
of labour is relatively high. It means that small farms lose their 
advantage in the industriialization process which draws labour out of 
agriculture. Ohkawa (1972) reports a narrowing of the inverse ratio in 
postwar Japan (cited by Mellor and Johnston 1984, p.559). Mellor and
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Johnston also state that this efficiency advantage of small farms may 
be offset by 'differentiating factors' such as a policy environment in 
which small farmers do not have access to credit or large farmers have 
access to tractors at artificially low prices (Mellor and Johnston 
1984, p.559). However, there is considerable evidence from many parts 
of Asia that as agriculture begins to modernize and make more intensive 
use of non-labour inputs, the inverse size-productivity relationship 
becomes less marked (Booth and Sundrum, forthcoming). Thus it can be 
hoped that co-operative farms, which practise new technology, would get 
the same or higher yields compared with the small farmers. According to 
Sen (1975, pp. 18-28), out of four parameters in a production function, 
i.e., proportionate share, concern for each other, cost advantage and 
technology, a co-operative can be certainly higher only in technology 
than a family farm. Unless a co-operative is higher in technology than 
a family farm its output and employment will be less than on a family 
farm where the three other parameters are higher.
In addition, by mobilising labour and capital co-operative farms 
can convert single-cropped lands into double-cropped ones, or 
uncultivated into cultivated lands, or reduce the extent of fallows. In 
this way, when family farms come together as co-operative farms, land, 
labour, and capital all increase, and output may increase more than 
proportionately. This is nothing but a clear case of economies of 
large scale (Khusro and Agarwal 1961, p.5) (Goyal 1966, pp.165-166).
2.9 Problems of Co-operative Farming
The co-operative farming system has certain problems which are 
particular to its organizational structure. The main problems are as 
follows.
2.9.1 Management problems
In most countries co-operative farms were imposed from outside 
rather than purely voluntarily established by farmers themselves. 
There has also been more or less government control or support in the 
activities of co-operative farms, and this has caused management 
problems between managers and members. Members are supposed to be both 
workers and participants in policy-making; managers are supposed to 
supervise the workers and at the same time to be responsible to them.
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Whether management is effective, and whether membership participation 
is meaningful, are among the most difficult problems in group farming 
(Dorner and Kanel 1977, p.6). Moreover, agricultural operations are
difficult to measure, and for remunerations of labour various norms and 
records are required, this can lead to high overhead and supervisory 
costs. In fact, there is the difficulty of securing a sufficient
number of agriculturalists with management ability capable of 
controlling a large labour force. Also, agriculture is a seasonal 
operation, and different jobs have to be performed during different 
seasons with great care, hence in a large farm extensive supervision is 
necessary. Managers have to direct a large body of workers here and 
there, often switching them from one job to another. If this were not 
done, output would suffer and if it is done effectively, managerial and 
supervisory costs may be very high. It is therefore difficult to have 
sound management on co-operative farms.
2.9.2 The Problem of Material Incentives
At various stages in the establishment and the working of a 
co-operative or collective organization the community interest has 
often appeared to diverge from the interests of the individuals. Here 
we must go back to the nature of the farmer. He is a person managing a 
business; he wants his family to be well cared for and he wants a 
respected place for himself and his family in the community. Being a 
farmer, he must seek to reach these goals through farming. Farmers are 
accustomed to a system of family farming and, however low their 
standards of living, they have adjusted themselves to this system. The 
agricultural production incentives in this system are:
1. remunerative price relationships
2. a reasonable share of the harvest
3. the availability of goods and services that farmers would 
like to be able to purchase for themselves and their 
families (Mosher 1966, pp. 99-100).
Together these provide the strongest economic (material) 
incentives. There are non-material incentives - farmers want respect 
and recognition from their friends and neighbours - but the most 
important incentives are economic.
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A farmer joining a co-operative farm must usually give up his 
independence as the holder of a farm and prepare to change entirely his 
manner of work. Co-operative farming involves the joint use of land 
and implements in production, and aims to expand the earnings of a 
common farm to which the farmers usually contribute their labour. 
Unlike the simple distribution of goods and services in the family 
farming system, distribution is complex in co-operative farms.
Co-operative farms not only have to pay taxes and exchange goods 
and services with the rest of the economy, but have to compensate 
individual peasants sufficient to induce them to work. The magic of 
private property does not exist in co-operative farms. The
socialization of agriculture fundamentally changes or eliminates 
traditional economic and social systems. In particular, the traditional 
means of motivation are changed and it is necessary to provide new 
incentives. Production incentives in collective farms can be
classified into material and non-material categories as follows:
1. Material incentives
a. Availability and price of consumer goods which 
peasants desire
b. Income from private plots
c. Costs in inputs
d. Income from labour depending on the size of 
deductions made from gross income from collective 
farms.
2. Non-material incentives
a. Competitive incentives --  Individual or group
competition
b. Co-operative incentives --  Mass movements, group
decision-making
c. Other --  Symbolic rewards, leadership
(Crook 1975, p.20)
The combination of the two elements varies from country to 
country. However, material incentives are much more important in the 
motivation of the peasants and we will focus on them.
Members of collective farms are not wage-earners. Theoretically 
they are part-owners of the collective, and are supposed to be 
compensated for their labour. They do not earn a set wage, but instead 
earn a claim against the returns of the farm. Distribution of a 
collective's returns on the basis of labour days is thus not a wage, 
but the division of the final residual.
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The amount to be transferred to each of the funds of a
co-operative and their order of priority are laid down by law. This may 
mean forced formation of capital and reduced consumption. Often the
remuneration of members is ranked lowest. If the amounts of the 
compulsory transfers are reduced and if the order of priorities is
modified it is possible to improve the remuneration of work even
without state subsisdies (Bergmann 1975, p.241). Having little control 
over the size of the residue, members tend to maximize individual 
incomes by earning more work points, sacrificing quality of work for 
quantity and wasting inputs. Quality control can be built into the 
point system, but this implies close inspection and supervision which 
is not always desirable or possible (Reed 1977, p.374). In recent years 
the ranking of wages in the order of priorities has been substantially 
raised in some socialist countries. For example, with the 1967 
Co-operative Law, co-operatives in Hungary were authorized to pay 
members' guaranteed annual salaries which takes precedence over 
liabilities to the state or material replacement costs. These salaries 
amount to about 80-95 percent of members' personal income for the year. 
The remainder of the income is paid as a year-end dividend based on the 
co-operative's net profit. The dividend system is thought to increase 
members' interest in raising the efficiency and profitability of the 
co-operatives as a whole (Hartford 1985, p.135). Now China also has 
turned to the 'responsibility system' which involves the assignment of 
land, animals and other assets to households in return for tax and 
sales quotas, a collective levy and some labour services. It has also 
done away with all aspects of collective management including work 
points (Watson 1983, p.713).
In the case of pooling private farms, the question arises of 
whether or not remuneration, at least for a time, should be provided 
for the land contributed by individuals. The incentive given to labour 
is reduced to the extent that the capital elements is rewarded, since 
all remuneration comes from the same limited output. But even in the 
socialization of agriculture in most communist countries the capital 
contribution has been taken into account, at least during a period of 
transition. Such a transition period may be necessary in developing 
countries. However, it is probably desirable legally to limit the 
percentage of net profits distributed on the basis of land contributed.
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Income from labour is usually not the only form of remuneration in 
a production co-operative. The private plot has been a part of group 
farming systems. In macro-economic terms, the collective and the 
hpousehold plots are complementary, while at the level of 
micro-economics they compete for the factors of production, notably 
animal feeds, labour and tractive capacity (Bergmann 1975, p.237). If 
the opportunity exists for maximizing personal incomes by spending more 
time on the private plots, peasants will do so. If production from the 
individual plots becomes too large a component of the family's overall 
livelihood, it will threaten the functioning of the co-operative
enterprises and endanger the achievements of other social, economic and 
political objectives of the system (Reed 1975, p.375). According to
Chinn, the existence of the private plots may be interpreted as a
necessary psychological mechanisms for achieving the transition, rather 
than a necessary requirement for the system to function at all (1978, 
p.263 ) .
It is probably best to recognize the importance of the private 
plots in the overall economy and to make resources (as well as 
technical assistance) available on a loan, rental, and/or purchase 
basis. Even with a shortage of inputs, some amounts should be made 
available to the private plots while maintaining the relative priority 
of the collective farms. Hungary has been actively encouraging and 
materially assisting private plot production within collectivized
agriculture. Hungarian officialdom has particularly emphasized that
(unlike the early experience of the co-operatives) production in 
small-scale farming complements rather than competes with large-scale 
farming. Small-scale farming's labour force and its means of production 
are uaually unsuitable for large-scale operations (Hartford 1985, 
p.138 ).
It is also important that the market price structure rewards 
collective production. If prices offered in the official channels are 
below those obtainable on the open market the result may be both the 
diversion of collective production to the private market and the 
diversion of scarce resources to private plots. Mackintosh (1985, p.91) 
suggests that safeguards should be set up such that the co-operatives 
are not forced to sell to the state at highly disadvantageous prices.
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One option is to give them the choice as to whether they sell to the 
state or not. Another is to allow them to negotiate their own pricing 
structure with the state marketing board or other state institution at 
the beginning of the season. Another safeguard is to give the 
co-operatives the same freedom to choose their crop mix as other 
producers. Finally, one of the most important aspects of state support 
for co-operative through marketing must be to ensure that the 
co-operative members can exchange their cash returns for consumer goods 
and inputs to develop production, including investment goods required 
to innovate in comparison with individual farmers. Reed also suggests 
to offer near-market or even special incentive prices for collective 
production (1977, p.378).
Historically, in the less successful cases of collectivization, a 
large part of the problem has been due to socialist accumulation 
through the imposition of very high rates of direct or concealed 
taxation on agriculture. The degree to which a co-operative distributes 
profits as income is regulated, indirectly, through a steeply 
progressive tax system. Therefore, rapid increases in the profitability 
of a co-operative do not automatically translate into large income 
increases for members. In Vietnam, however, agricultural taxation on 
co-operatives has been relatively low. A proportion of taxes is 
returned to, or retained by, the co-operatives as their accumulation 
fund. Despite the fact that Vietnam is primarily an agricultural 
country, it is the profits of the state-owned industrial sector which 
has supplied the overwhelming majority of state revenues (White 1985, 
p.95).
The motivating force behind a group of farmers pooling their 
assets and efforts in agricultural production could be the promise it 
offered for improving their families' standard of living and giving 
them a greater chance of participating in educational and cultural 
opportunities. Meanwhile, the goals of the government are usually 
broader than the goals of an individual. There is a divergence of 
interests between the state and members of co-operatives. The state 
wants to increase production, have greater investment which may require 
restraining consumption, discourage the emergence of economically 
successful individual peasants as a superior social class, and increase
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its base of political support. Co-operative members want to adequate 
income and services, autonomy of personal life, opportunities to 
advance within co-operative and ancillary organizations, as well as 
possibilities for engaging in some private family farming (Dorner and 
Kanel 1977, p.10). Therefore, the more closely positive economic
incentives for the co-operative farms are aligned with the general 
economic goals of the society, the less need there will be for use of 
direct control mechanisms.
2.9.3 Voluntary membership and recognition of private property
Voluntary membership is one of the main principles of co-operative 
farming. However, it is now widely accepted that if participation in 
co-operative farming is voluntary, it is unlikely that land will be 
pooled on any appreciable scale (Sinha 1976, p.56). It is clear that 
co-operative development can be achieved in the developing countries 
only if governments lend their active support. Voluntariness must
therefore mean voluntary action in the face of incentives provided by 
government through co-operatives. Voluntariness must not be interpreted 
in the laissez-faire sense of the government doing nothing to encourage 
such a voluntary action. Some even suggest the use of compulsion if 
voluntary effort fail to achieve any perceptible result (Sinha 1976, 
pp.56-65). Some justify the use of compulsion by arguing that, if 
there is a curbing of the individual's desires, it is essential in the 
interests of society (Goyal 1966, p.87). But it is important to note
that compulsion can lead to the failure of a co-operative movement due 
to mass non-cooperation. On the other hand, voluntary membership has 
been a serious obstacle to the consolidation of holdings into
economically viable units, as some peasants may not forego their rights 
to do what they please with their lands. Similarly, if a member has 
the right to withdraw from a co-operative farm, the stability of the 
farm is threatened. In the earlier years of collectivization in Poland, 
the voluntary co-operatives frequently had to be reorganized as a 
result of withdrawals, and it became impossible for the co-operatives 
to set long-term targets for investments or production (Sinha 1976, 
p.56).
In addition, one further obstacle to the success of co-operative 
farming is the recognition of private property in land and other
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assets. When the right to private property in land and other assets is 
respected, initial inequalities in economic and political power may 
persist in the management of co-operative farms. In most co-operative 
farming ventures the membership is limited to those who pool their land 
and other material resources; landless labourers do not qualify for 
membership (Sinha 1976, p.56).
Obviously, co-operative organizations have some serious 
limitations and they do not serve as a panacea for all rural ills. But 
they do offer an organizational framework to reform agriculture and 
they do tend to serve the interests of the rural poor.
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CHAPTER 3
CO-OPERATIVE EXPERIENCES IN CHINA AND INDIA
The following brief discussion on the organization, progress and 
working of agricultural co-operatives in China and India is only to 
point to certain features salient to Burmese experience. China has been 
carrying out a socialist transformation of agriculture and some 
features of its experience with rural development up to the late 1970s 
have been suggested for adoption in many of the new development 
proposals. As regards India, the Indian Co-operative Credit Societies 
Act of 1904 was applied to Burma as a province of India under British 
rule, and India also has much experience both in service and production 
co-operatives. The major aim of this chapter is to examine the Chinese 
and Indian experiences in the context of Burmese conditions.
3.1 China
When the Chinese Communist Party came to power in 1949, land 
reform was implemented throughout the country. The Chinese leaders 
accepted land reform as the basic starting point for rural development. 
After land reform, the Chinese Communist Party encouraged the peasants 
to form themselves into mutual aid teams. Mutual aid teams were 
organized by a few households primarily to exchange labour and draught 
animals during the peak season. Seasonal, and then permanent, mutual 
aid teams were formed between 1949 and 1952. Meanwhile, the Government 
made separate efforts to convert some of the mutual aid teams into 
elementary agricultural producers' co-operatives.
Elementary agricultural producers' co-operatives were based on the 
motto of 'centralised management but private ownership' (Wong 1977, 
p . 119). Members contributed their land as capital shares to the
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co-operatives and received rent payments. Stressing voluntary
participation, the Chinese Communist Party recommended persuasion as 
the main method of implementing cooperativization. But in many places, 
cadres blindly chased figures and political pressure was exerted to 
boost membership. According to a survey in August 1954, of the 95,000 
elementary co-operatives established early in that year, only 30 
percent could be rated as well organized (Cheng 1982, p.72).
Co-operatives in which middle and rich peasants had gained control 
tended to fix higher rents than those in which poor peasants had won
control, and rent disputes caused great antagonism between poor and
middle peasants (Cheng 1982, p.80). The rich and middle peasants
slaughtered livestock on a large scale and refrained from improving 
their land. Throughout the country, draught animals died from overwork 
and neglect.
The pooling of thirty to forty households' resources required a 
great deal of planning, administration, and book-keeping. Peasants 
were too illiterate to supply the co-operatives with qualified 
accountants and some were too poor to contribute share funds, and
managerial problems were acute in China after cooperativization. With 
the rapid growth of co-operatives there was a shortage of accountants. 
In turn, it was difficult to assess and evaluate the performances of 
the members and to distribute income correctly. This quelled the
enthusiasm of capable members.
During the early 1950s, an intensive debate on the time schedule 
of collectivization took place among the top Chinese leadership. Mao 
opposed the gradualist approach and demanded the adoption of a National 
Programme for Agricultural Development, 1956-1967. The programme 
stipulated firstly that in some areas with favourable conditions all 
peasants should be brought into the advanced type of co-operatives 
(collectives) by 1957, and secondly that the conversion of the whole 
countryside into advanced co-operatives should be accomplished by 1958 
(Cheng 1982, p.74). In advanced co-operatives, there were no rent 
payments to members and income distribution was based solely on work 
contributions. Various norms were used for the compensation of labour. 
By the end of 1957, China's 120 million peasant households had been 
organized into 752,113 co-operatives, of which 668,081 were of the
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advanced type. Thus the main task for the socialist transformation of 
agriculture had been fulfilled by the end of 1957. According to 
Bergmann, it was an agrarian revolution without modern technology 
(1975, p .175 ) .
Compared with the collectivization drive in the Soviet Union, the 
Chinese movement seems to have been more successful; it encountered no 
organized peasant rebellion and had fewer adverse effects on
agricultural production. The Chinese leaders pursued a step-by-step 
approach, each stage providing the basis for higher development. The 
step-by-step transition helped to avoid a feeling of suddenness and 
shock among the peasants (Cheng 1982, p.84). But peasant resistance in 
the form of slaughtering livestock, neglect of land improvement and 
suspension of subsidiary occupations such as pig-raising was
experienced at almost every step. However, several factors made the 
smooth, rapid collectivization of China's countryside possible. They 
were :
1. The Chinese Communist Party had a strong rural organization 
by 1955;
2. The Party in China exhibited effective leadership;
3. There was an enduring tradition of collective activities in 
China;
4. China was able to learn from Russia's mistakes (Stavis 1979, 
pp.169-173).
However, with the completion of collectivization in 1957, most of 
the distinguishing features of class, based on private ownership of
land, ceased to exist. All classes received the same size of private
plot per person. There was little difference in per capita income 
among poor peasants, middle peasants, and former landlords. In Yunan 
Province, in 1956, per capita income of poor peasants was 81.3 yuan 
while that of rich peasants and of former landlords were 101.9 yuan and 
97.8 yuan respectively (Cheng 1982, p.85).
In an economic sense, collectivization failed to improve the
land-population ratio. The population continued to grow at a rate of 
2.2 percent during the 1952-1957 period, while cultivated land
increased at a rate of less than 1 percent a year (Cheng 1982, p.85). 
There was an increase of double-cropping of food grain, which,
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according to official statistics, added 128 million mu to the area sown 
for grain in 1952-1957 (Cheng 1982, p.88). As the total sown area in 
1957 was 2342.72 million mu the increase was 5.46 percent of the total 
sown area. But, in 1957, the volume of food grain output rose by only 
1 percent although the gross value of agricultural production increased 
by 3.5 percent.
Agricultural collectivization during the 1949-1957 period 
succeeded more in equalising the distribution of peasant income than in 
promoting agricultural output. The main impetus for collectivization 
seems to have come from the quest for social, political and economic 
equality rather than from the growth objective. In less than two years 
after collectivization, China again launched the Great Leap Forward in 
which collectives were merged and regrouped into people's communes. But 
a high degree of managerial inefficiency was experienced all over China 
during the early years of the communisation movement.
The scale of operation seems extremely important. Many of the 
difficulties arose from a lack of co-ordination and guidance, resulting 
from the enormous geographical coverage of individual communes. As the 
communes were multi-village units there was an eruption of 
inter-village factionalism. Further, the assignment of peasants to 
work outside both native village and the marketing community aroused 
very deep resentment (Shillinglaw 1971, p.90). The Chinese leadership 
realised its mistake and the size of communes was drastically reduced 
by splitting the initial 24,000 communes into more than 70,000 (Sinha 
1976, p.63).
The Chinese leadership had been concious of the other limitation 
of a collective enterprise, i.e the lack of personal incentives. In the 
early stages of communisation, it was intended that a large part of the 
distributable income should be given out in the form of a 'free supply' 
such as free meals at the mess halls. But this diminished the incentive 
to work and encouraged wasteful consumption. By 1961, free supply came 
to an end and the mess halls were closed down. Private plots, private 
livestock and the rural markets, which were abolished during the 
establishment of the communes, were revived.
The role of communes in mobilising labour and in the creation of 
infrastructure such as irrigation and transport networks, or in
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bringing industries to the rural areas is widely acknowledged. 
Furthermore, the communes were able to guarantee employment and meet 
the basic needs of rural people, although communization meant some 
sharing of underemployment. Starvation and pestilence seem to be 
experiences of the past. But since the late 1970s the Chinese 
leadership has expressed its dissatisfaction with progress in rural 
development and China has now turned to what is called the 'Four 
Modernizations', including the 'modernization of agriculture', which 
puts emphasis on technological change. However, the processes of 
cooperativization and of communization in China vividly illustrate the 
importance of management and material incentives in collective farming. 
A country should not go too far in the social control of agriculture, 
and a degree of self-interest is essential in collective farming, as 
discussed in subsection 2.9.2.
3.2 India
The co-operative movement started in India in 1904 when the first 
Co-operative Credit Societies Act was passed by the then Government of
India. In 1912 some of the deficiencies of the Act of 1904 were
removed, and under its provisions societies with aims other than
providing credit alone could be registered under the Co-operative 
Societies Act. Many types of societies sprang up after 1912. In rural 
areas societies were formed to purchase seeds, manures, and implements, 
to sell produce, to undertake the preparation of dairy, rice and cotton 
products, and for other purposes, such as consolidation of holdings and 
irrigation. But co-operation was chiefly confined to credit functions. 
Cases of mismanagement, failures and even frauds and other serious 
drawbacks were many during the subsequent years. The movement was
strongest in Punjab, Bombay, Madras, and Mysore. Elsewhere only a 
small proportion of the population was brought into contact with the 
movement. The report of a special committee in 1915 pointed out the 
danger of permitting unauthorized overdues (loans not repaid by the due 
date) to increase, and the tendency to depart from co-operative 
principles. Reorganization took place and many societies were 
liquidated. Under British rule, India had the same agricultural credit 
problem as Burma. In 1938, an Agricultural Credit Department was set
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up in the Reserve Bank, and in 1949 a major study urged greater 
assistance to co-operatives from the Reserve Bank. At the beginning 
of the First Five Year Plan (1951-1956), it was recognized that an 
adequate solution to the credit problem had not been found (Mellor 
1968, p.62). But in 1967 there were 181,016 agricultural credit 
co-operatives in India and the credit available through co-operatives 
accounted for 40 percent of total agricultural borrowing (Singh 1970, 
pp.9-52). Nevertheless, overdues continue to be a serious weakness of 
the co-operative credit societies. Overdues formed 43.9 percent of the 
outstanding loans by 1969-70 (Shrishrimal 1977, p.194).
Up to the period of the Second Five Year Plan (1956-61), marketing 
and consumers' co-operatives were largely considered secondary to 
credit co-operatives. In 1954, the Report of the Rural Credit Survey 
Committee recommended the development of marketing and other
co-operatives for formulating an 'integrated scheme for rural credit' 
(Javadekar 1977, p.313). After that, the figures for the development 
of marketing societies were striking. At the end of June 1967, there 
were 3,290 primary marketing societies, of which over 2,750 were 
organized on a territorial basis and the rest were specialized single 
commodity societies (Singh 1970, p.336). But a survey in 1966-1967
(Javadekar 1977, pp.319-321), showed that marketing co-operatives had 
performed poorly. Non-cooperative institutions such as groups of 
traders had more freedom of action, and they exercised it. It was not 
so in the case of co-operatives; their democratic character made 
on-the-spot decisions difficult, without which successful competition 
with experienced traders in the field became more and more difficult. 
Another factor that affected the co-operatives was the lack of 
processing units for milling or preserving. Further, it was observed 
that non-cooperative businesses were doing more business than the 
co-operatives in terms of turnover per rupee. Capital turnover per 
rupee of medium co-operatives was 2. 16 while that of medium 
non-cooperative business was 2.94 (Javadekar 1977, p.317). The
co-operatives had a tendency to rely more on Government patronage which 
provided them with a monopoly position in the market.
1India regained its independence in 1947.
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Another survey in Punjab and Haryana in 1966-67 (Javadekar 1977, 
pp.321-323) also showed that services like credit, storage facilities, 
transportation and so on, were more easily available from traders than 
from marketing co-operatives. Interest charged by traders was 12 
percent to 18 percent as against 10 percent charged by co-operatives, 
but, even then, traders were preferred by the cultivators. This was 
because of their promptness in service and the secrecy maintained by 
them in the matter of loans. The personal relationship between the 
trader and the cultivator was another reason. Hospitality from 
co-operatives was lacking and the working hours and rules of 
co-operatives were more rigid than those of the traders. The Fifth Five 
Year Plan therefore emphasized the consolidation and strengthening of 
the existing co-operative marketing structure and the formation of new 
agricultural processing units in the co-operative sector. However, we 
should not overlook the following remarks made by Rudra:
The talk of co-operatives in the field of credit and 
marketing still continues - it occupies a lot of space in the 
fifth plan volume. Such co-operatives are indeed quite 
widespread, but it is widely accepted that these organizations 
mostly perform a function very different from the one
visualised for them in the pre-independence nationalist 
ideology. . . . The prevalent practice is for rich farmers to 
form co-operatives and receive aid from the state (1979,
pp.81-82 ) .
As regards co-operative farming, the first attempts were made in 
1921, and the movement received an impetus after India regained her 
independence. Intermediaries like the Jagirdars and the Zamindars were 
compensated and abolished throughout the country (Khusro and Agarwal 
1961, p.31). The Planning Commission, which was set up in 1950,
favoured the development of co-operative farming. The response of the 
Planning Commission to the problem of organizing small farmers in 
co-operative farming societies, however, varied over time. According 
to Chinchankar (1977, pp.242-257), the policies pursued by the Planning 
Commission for the development of co-operative farming may be divided 
into three phases. The first phase, which covered a period from 1951 
to 1966 and corresponded to the first three five year plans, was 
characterised by a policy of experimentation. The second phase, 
embracing the period of the three annual plans from 1966 to 1969, was
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marked by consolidation of the movement. The third phase, which began 
with the Fourth Five Year Plan in 1969-1970 and onward, was 
characterised by passive efforts.
During the phase of experimentation, there was considerable 
support for co-operative farming. At the 64th session of the Congress 
Party, held in 1959 in Nagpur, the future agrarian pattern was declared 
to be of co-operative farming. Service co-operatives were to precede
co-operative farming and the formation of the former was to be
completed by the end of 1961 (Goyal 1966, p • 78 ). But the Nagpur
Resolution did not go unchallenged. There was a debate in the
Parliament and it also caused widespread controversy about the merits 
of co-operative farming, and several political leaders expressed 
misgivings about the scheme. The controversy retarded the progress of 
the movement, and the opposition to co-operative farming induced the 
Government to declare, with particular emphasis, that co-operative 
farming societies should be established only on a completely voluntary 
basis (Schiller 1969, p .113). The attitudes of the State Governments 
ranged from acceptance to indifference, and from indifference to 
positive hostility (Khusro and Agarwal 1961, p 35). As a result there 
was slow and uneven progress in the movement. When the Third Five Year 
Plan programme was proposed the Planning Commission stated that ' the 
main problems of co-operative farming are organizational, technical and 
educational' (Chinchankar 1977, p.247). It also emphasised the need to 
study the internal management problems faced by many co-operative 
farming societies. In 1965, the Report of the Committee of Direction 
on Co-operative Farming (Chinchankar 1977, pp.249-252) concluded that 
co-operative farming had not taken firm roots. The Committee also noted 
a number of drawbacks from which the movement suffered.
According to the Committee, as the programme was officially
inspired there was an absence of non-official leadership. Voluntary
co-operatives can not be formed successfully without non-official
leadership. If the local initiators are respected and accepted by the
2local communities local participation can be assured. In addition,
We must take into account this fact as the Burmese movement also is 
officially inspired.
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many farming societies, according to the Committee, were dominated by 
big farmers and there were enrolments of non-working members. In the 
collective farming societies the non-working members constituted about 
19.1 percent of the total, but their proportion was as high as 28.3 
percent in the joint farming societies. Again, among the working 
members, full-time working members constituted about 60 percent of the 
total number of working members in both types of societies in 1971-72. 
The remaining 40 percent were those who worked 'part-time in field 
operations' and 'others' (Chinchankar 1977, p.274). This may have been 
due to the lack of sufficient incentives. The Committe pointed out the 
lack of non-farming activities to provide employment and opportunities, 
and inadequate provision of technical and financial guidance as the 
drawbacks of the Indian co-operative farming movement.
In India in many cases co-operative farming societies were 
established with the intention of obtaining government subsidies. Quite 
often a land-owner split his large plots of land and transferred these 
to the names of near relatives. Then the various parts were registered 
together as a co-operative farm. Thus some societies resembled more a 
large family farm, and management was invariably in the hands of the 
biggest partners. The surveys conducted during 1961-1962 disclosed 
that as many as 70 out of 91 societies in Kerala failed to carry out 
cultivation and management on a joint basis. In fact such societies 
were fictitious co-operatives.
Another important defect pointed out by the Committee was the 
absence of work allotments and norms in the management of co-operative 
farms. The majority of societies had not introduced norms or any other 
system of assessing performance. Generally, work on the farm was 
compensated according to the locally prevalent rates.^ The Committee 
also pointed out the opposition of the political parties as a drawback 
of the movement.
In fact, creating off-farm work opportunities and provision of 
technical and financial guidance will be also important in Burma since 
there exist unemployment and underemployment at least seasonally and 
agricultural productvity is generally low.
4If differences in skill and ability are not evaluated and rewarded, 
disincentive may develop among skilled and able members which would 
affect production. At least simple norms should be laid down so that 
members realize what is expected of them.
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Thus the Committee recommended the revitalization of the societies 
and suggested restricting the development of co-operative farming to 
selected areas in India. The recommendations were accepted and the 
State Governments were directed to give priority to revitalization. By 
1969-70, the number of joint and collective farming societies at work 
stood at only 8,819. With the gradual decline in developmental efforts, 
the progress of co-operative farming stagnated. An official report in 
1973-74 observed that only a few states were keen on the co-operative 
farming programme (Chinchankar 1977, pp.255-256). During the planning 
period spanning 25 years, not even one percent of the total cropped 
area was brought under co-operatives.
According to Chinchankar (1977, pp.256-267), the failure of the 
co-operative farming movement was in large measure attributable to 
half-hearted policy, the indifferent attitudes of the State 
Governments, constraints on financial resources, lack of administrative 
support, and last but not least, the political controversy over the 
idea of co-operative farming. Although the Planning Commission
underlined the importance of co-operative farming, it did not, and 
probably could not, follow this up with bold efforts for its 
development (Chinchankar 1977, pp.256-257). Due to the emphasis on 
experimentation, the programme of co-operative farming was gradually 
isolated from the mainstream of agricultural planning. Rudra remarks :
Talks of co-operatives, joint farming and co-operative aids 
to individual farming were kept up during the first plan and 
the second plan (1951-1955 and 1956-1960), but there was no 
further talk of any enforcement. Even talk of co-operation in 
the field of production has ceased since then (1979, p.81).
In addition to the half-hearted policy of the Planning Commission, 
the progress of the co-operative farming movement was hampered by the 
indifferent attitude of the State Governments. In many states, 
c-operative farming schemes were regarded as of secondary importance 
since the governments were preoccupied with the development of 
co-operative credit. Even where the state governments encouraged 
co-operative farming, they took hardly any measures to ensure 
coordination among developmental departments for the progress of the 
movement. The state governments made only belated efforts to promote 
co-operative farming, and it took almost seven years after it was first
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One other factor hindering co-operative farming was constraints on 
financial resources. Due to the Chinese-Indian war (October 1962) and 
the Indo-Pakistan war (September 1965), several state governments 
effected a financial cut in co-operative farming programmes. While 
co-operative farming programmes needed strong financial support, these 
cuts were compounded by inadequacies in the administrative machinery. 
Administrative arrangements, laws and procedures for giving financial 
assistance and agricultural supplies, which were designed primarily to 
promote agricultural production on individual farms, were not suitably 
adapted to the needs of co-operative farming societies. In many cases, 
societies found themselves seriously handicapped and were not able to 
obtain even the assistance that was available to individual farmers. 
Moreover, in many areas the technical guidance given by staff was 
neither adequate nor of the standard required.
Lastly, the spread of co-operative farming was also checked by 
furious ideological debate. As we have stated above, the great debate 
after the Nagpur Resolution retarded the progress of the movement. The 
experience of Khargone district in Madhya Pradesh, where the political 
atmosphere was extremely unfavourable to co-operative farming, is a 
good example. In sum, then, the Indian experience well illustrates how 
firm political decisions, government support and a favourable political 
atmosphere are essential to the formation of a co-operative farming 
system in developing countries.
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CHAPTER 4
THE CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT BEFORE THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION
4.1 The Co-operative Movement Before the Second World War
As we have seen in Chapter 1, private money-lenders were the most 
important agency for meeting the credit needs of small cultivators in 
Burma in the colonial period. The co-operative movement was started to 
free the small cultivator from this dependence on the money-lenders. 
But it was introduced without any previous inquiry to ascertain the 
need or the demand for it. It was imposed from above and was inspired 
by the desire of the Government to involve the cultivators themselves 
in credit provision. The Co-operative Credit Societies Act was passed 
by the then Government of India in 1904. It owed its inception to the 
report of the Indian Famine Commission of 1901, which recommended the 
introduction of mutual credit societies in India. It may fairly be 
surmised that Burma had no place in the thoughts of the Government of 
India when the new policy was formulated (Burma 1949, p.85). It would 
seem, however, that the Lieutenant-General of the day desired that 
Burma should enjoy whatever benefits the new legislation could offer 
(Burma 1949, p.85). However, the co-operative movement in Burma was 
associated with rural development from the very beginning.
4.1.1 Co-operative Credit Societies
The first co-operative credit society was formed at Myinmu in 
Upper Burma in 1905; in 1910 there were 202 societies with a membership 
of 6116. Finance was to be provided from the share capital of 
societies, from deposits, and from loans by Government, which undertook 
to advance an amount equal to the share capital and deposits of each
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society. But deposits collected locally were small, and the needs of 
societies could not be met from share capital and Government loans. The 
Upper Burma Central Union Co-operative Bank was established in 1910 to 
collect funds to finance societies, and it became in 1920 the Burma 
Provincial Co-operative Bank. Revised legislation (1912) removed some 
of the deficiencies of the Act of 1904 and widened the scope of the 
societies. New types of societies such as cattle insurance societies
sprang up in rural areas after 1912. But credit societies were
predominant. The Provincial Co-operative Bank financed co-operatives 
throughout the country, through the district or township central banks 
where such existed, and directly financed 2300 primary co-operatives in 
22 districts (ILO 1955, p.9). The difficulties of dispensing credit
from a single centre over wide areas were obvious, and it was thought 
that they might be overcome by grouping the societies into Unions to 
supervise and to assess credit and guarantee borrowings by the
societies. Fostered by money supplied by the public through the 
Provincial Co-operative Bank, the societies grew in number. However,
there was no proportionate increase in the government staff who 
supervised and inspected the societies.
During this period there was a rapid growth of national spirit, 
and the increase in number of co-operatives was partly attributable to 
constant emphasis, by the Burmese nationalist leaders, on rural 
cooperation and land problems. By 1925 there were 4,057 societies, with 
92,005 members; this was the peak period of the co-operative movement 
before the Second World War. A period of decline then set in. Members 
began to fail to repay the loans due to their co-operatives, with the 
result that the latter were unable to repay the banks which had 
financed them.
The Calvert Committee Report submitted in 1929 revealed that the 
Burma Provincial Co-operative Bank was insolvent and that the whole 
movement was generally in a state of collapse. Even before the 
depression the movement was in a shaky position. On the recommendation 
of the Calvert Committee, the Government liquidated many of the 
societies on account of heavy overdues. The Provincial Co-operative
Bank (the apex bank) was liquidated in 1932, the Government undertaking 
liability for the Bank's obligations and taking over its assets. When
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the societies were liquidated both the moveable and fixed property of 
members was seized by liquidators, since members' liabilities were 
unlimited. The world depression, with its fall in cereal prices, 
hastened the decline of the co-operatives, and the co-operative 
movement reached its lowest ebb in 1934-35. Only 1,371 societies were 
then left and liabilities of liquidated societies amounted to 6,800 
thousand rupees of which only 323 thousands were recovered during the 
year, mostly through the auction of land. By June 1935, 70,334 acres of 
land had passed to the liquidators, of which 41,588 acres belonged to 
societies indebted to the Provincial Co-operative Bank (BSPP 1970, 
pp.244-251).
The policy of seizing and selling every asset of members in 
pursuance of the principle of unlimited libility reduced the status of 
cultivators to that of tenants or labourers. Liquidation was obviously 
not in itself a solution, and the problem of how to save the
co-operative movement and re-establish it on a sound footing, was
1tackled by the Registrar, U Tin Gyi. The debts of the members were 
scaled down to what could be recovered out of yearly income over a
reasonable period. These were to be repaid by instalments and periods 
of repayment ranged from 5 to 15 years. Further, the societies let the 
foreclosed land to the original owners at a rent equal to the annual 
instalment fixed. On payment of the last instalment the land passed 
back into the possession of the member by paying a nominal sum of one 
rupee. Fresh loans were advanced to the members for the purpose of 
culti-vatj_on / and annual instalments and crop loans were repaid in kind
to the society. This reconstruction work was known as the rent purchase
system and the system worked well. Crop loans and rent purchase
annuities were fully recovered. The reconstruction work started in 
1935 and the agricultural credit societies numbered 1,599 by 1941 (BSPP 
1970, pp.253-261. )
This post equaled that of senior Director.
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4.1.2 Causes of the Failure of the Co-operative Movement
The co-operative movement was begun with optimism, and much was 
expected of it. Men were to combine to obtain money on loan on the 
basis of their personal security and integrity; indebtedness was to 
disappear, and after ten years, societies were to be self-supporting
and working largely on their own capital (Burma 1924, p.1). But the
movement was a failure.
Furnivall asserts that the movement was less successful than might 
have been expected (1957, p.132). According to him, two advantages were 
gained from the movement. The first was that the additional supply of 
capital which the co-operative movement had made available to
agriculturalists in Burma had tended to reduce the rate of interest 
paid by Burmese cultivators in general. The second was that it had 
done much to organize, for productive purposes, Burmese capital which 
had previously been left idle or buried in the ground. It had also
familiarised both rich and poor with the procedures of banking 
(Furnivall 1957, pp.128-135). No one will deny the second advantage, 
but the first one is doubtful. Even at its maximum extent the
co-operative movement provided only a fraction of the credit needs of 
agriculture. Less than 5 percent of the eligible agrarian householders 
belonged to about 4,500 co-operatives in all of Burma. Few Burmese 
agriculturalists in the Delta, where debt was heaviest, joined local 
co-operatives. The co-operative credit societies were designed to 
provide crop loans for short periods, while the cultivators in the 
Delta wanted long-term loans for purchases of land or cattle. Most 
members in the Delta therefore used the funds borrowed from societies 
for purchases of land or cattle and they could not repay it. In 
addition, it was very difficult to have societies in the Delta where 
the cultivators were essentially migratory. Furnivall also points out 
this fact. Even in the districts in Upper Burma where the movement 
enjoyed greater success, less than 10 percent of all agrarian loans 
were obtained from co-operatives (Adas 1974, p.138). Therefore
co-operative loans were relatively too small to have a significant 
effect on the rate of interest paid by cultivators in general.
According to the Report of the Burma Provincial Banking Enquiry 
Committee (1929-1930), the causes for the general failure of the
movement were:
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1. bad harvests in Upper Burma between 1918-1924
2. neglect of fundamental principles and the failure to confine 
loans to proper amounts and uses
3. neglecting to lend according to capacity of borrowers
4. insufficient connection with the commercial banking system 
of the country
5. failure to deal strictly with members and societies which 
did not repay (cited by Wai 1963, pp.75-76).
It is true that there was a lack of understanding of the 
fundamental principles of co-operation among the people, and the 
movement was launched before the people were sufficiently educated 
about it. With the unduly rapid growth of societies, the Co-operative 
Societies Department was unable to give sufficient attention to 
education in cooperation and relied more and more on the Unions to 
perform this duty. The department suffered from a lack of adequately 
trained staff. The position was worse in the Unions and the societies. 
The Unions also failed to perform their duties. Fictitious figures and 
paper adjustments of repayments and fresh loans were common, and 
auditors failed to examine repayments in order to check book 
adjustments. The rather elaborate audit forms provided for the 
co-operatives were generally more confusing than helpful (BSPP 1970, 
pp.272-274; Burma 1949, pp.87-101)
According to Furnivall, the chief reason for the failure of the 
movement was that societies had not been sufficiently strict in 
insisting on the punctual repayment of loans, and that the auditors and 
inspectors of the Co-operative Department had failed to press the 
committees of the societies into carrying out their duties (1957, 
p.134). It is true that if auditing had been more thorough, and the 
societies had insisted on the punctual repayment of loans, the state of 
affairs would not have been as bad as it was. Some Indian Provinces 
also experienced overdues and liquidation of credit co-operatives, but 
it was seldom necessary to make a call upon the unlimited liability of 
members. This may have been because of better supervision than in 
Burma. It is likely that linking marketing functions with credit in 
these societies would have been more effective, rather than merely 
insisting on the punctual repayment of loans. But, it is unlikely that
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this could have saved the movement from failure. It is very difficult 
to achieve sound co-operative marketing functions while the members 
remain indebted to local merchant money-lenders. As co-operative loans 
were small in Burma, members of societies had to fall back on the 
money-lenders.
Advances for cultivation and living expenses must be adequate if 
outside borrowing is to be avoided; credit must be adequate as well as 
strictly controlled. Reconstruction experience during 1935-1940 showed 
that the member cultivators were ready to repay their dues, if they did 
not have to rely on the money-lenders, and if the dues were within 
their repaying capacity. Incorporating marketing functions also 
ensured repayments during the reconstruction period. In reality, the 
member cultivators failed to repay their loans due to their low income. 
Average paddy yield per acre was 28.17 baskets (1296 lbs) (Burma 1957, 
p.12), though it is now over 60 baskets. Much of the crop was 
transferred from the cultivator to local shopkeepers, money-lenders, 
and brokers at the threshing floor in settlement of existing debts.
The demands on the cultivator's crops at the time of harvest could be 
summarised as rent, tax, cost of labour and cattle (of which much was 
paid in kind at harvest), repayment of loans from money-lenders and 
seed for the next year's crop. The only produce left in the
cultivator's hand was that part for home consumption and seed paddy. 
Too little was left for cultivators and they lived at a subsistence
level. Even if the societies insisted on the repayment of loans the 
members would have nothing with which to repay them. The only way to 
redeem a loan from farmers would be by foreclosing, as was done during 
the liquidation period.
In fact, the problem for which the cultivators in Burma had to 
find a solution was not one of the provision of credit alone. This was 
only one of the factors contributing to a solution of the real problem, 
namely, the improvement of the economic conditions of the cultivator. 
The supply of cheap credit could not by itself achieve this end.
Poverty and debt became a vicious circle. The remedy consisted of 
raising income, either by increasing agricultural productivity for
2Aerage for the years 1936-37 to 1940-41.
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those with land, or by providing non-farm jobs for those without land. 
Therefore, the chief reason for the failure of the co-operative 
movement was the lack of marketing functions, insufficient credit 
provided by the societies, and the low income of the member 
cultivators.
4.1.3 Cattle Insurance Societies
The cattle insurance societies were formed after 1912 and these 
societies were well known for their features. Farmers were insured 
against death of livestock, both plough cattle and buffaloes between 
the ages of 4 and 12 years were accepted for insurance, and the 
societies confined their operations to single villages. The premium 
was fixed at 5 percent of the value of the animal and was payable in 
two half-yearly instalments. Indemnity payments were only two-thirds of 
the value of the animal. A most interesting, and perhaps original, 
feature of the Burmese scheme was a system of re-insurance with a 
central society (Aiyer, 1951, p.165). All the village societies were 
affiliated to the central society, and one half of the premium paid for 
each animal was sent to the latter. When an animal died, the central 
society met half the indemnity payable, the other half being paid by 
the village society. In 1916, there were 30 5 societies with 5,045 
members with a total risk insurance of Rs 287,061 of which Rs 113,050 
was the risk re-insured. Although these societies did not cover many 
farmers they made noteworthy progress. But no records about these 
societies for the period 1940-45 have been found, having disappeared 
during the Second World War.
4.1.4 The Colonisation System
By the term 'colonisation' we mean the placing and keeping of 
peasant cultivators on waste lands brought into cultivation by means of 
systematic reclamation. Colonisation started as a branch of the 
activities of the Co-operative Societies Department in the Kadonbaw 
Fuel Reserve in 1914-1915 and was extended from 1917 to 1923 into the 
Yitkangyi Fuel Reserve in Pegu South and the Alangon Reserve along the 
Gulf of Martaban (Burma 1949, p.136).
Selected colonists were settled in these areas and a number of 
Tenancy Co-partnership Co-operative Credit Societies were formed with
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memberships of 25 to 40. To each society the Government leased a block 
of land (1000 to 2000 acres) and issued loans under the Agriculturists' 
Loans Act. The society in turn divided up its blocks into plots 
averaging about 40 acres, and sub-let each plot to its members. In 1923 
the colonies extended over an area of about 120,000 acres producing 
80,000 tons of paddy annually. These societies were grouped into the 
Sittang Colonies Co-operative Banking Union Ltd which later became the 
State Colonies Bank. In about 1933 a rice mill was purchased and a 
system of collection, milling and sale of the produce from the colonies 
was developed. Members paid dues in produce, this was marketed by the 
Union and any balance remaining after deduction of dues was returned to 
the members concerned. In addition to the compulsory delivery of paddy 
in payment of dues, colonists were encouraged to hand over the rest of 
their crop for the Union to market. The colonists got a better price 
for their produce by milling and selling through the Union than they 
got from millers and rice brokers. When the Second World War broke out 
there were 155 societies and the colonies extended over an area of 
251,557 acres in seven districts. But during the war period there was 
little activity in the colonies and the moribund societies were
liquidated due to malpractices. However, the colonies attained a fair 
measure of success and the societies were reconstructed after 
independence as Multi-purpose Co-operative Societies. The working of 
these colonies seems to show that the small cultivator can be settled 
and maintained on such lands, especially if he is adequately financed 
and systematically provided with marketing facilities.
4.2 The Co-operarive Movement After Independence
During the Second World War, Burma suffered enormous destruction 
of its industrial, transportation, communications, agricultural and 
productive capacity. Millions of acres of fertile paddy land were
overrun by jungle, and the area under cultivation fell by half between 
1939 and 1945. In 1948 Burma regained its independence. Even before
independence the Burmese nationalist leader, General Aung San, in his
3From 12,816,000 acres in 1938-39 to 6,983,000 acres in 1945-46. For 
details see Tinker, 1968, p.227.
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Presidential Address at the Second Session of the Supreme Council of 
4AFPFL in 1946, mentioned the role of co-operatives in rehabilitating 
the economy.
The need for a country-wide Co-operative Movement is timely 
and quite proper. Besides the spirit of co-operation and 
organization that will instil in the minds of our people, it 
will also encourage thrift, self-help and creative endeavour, 
for then people will know, as they toil on, that it is the best 
way to promote national prosperity when there is much dearth of 
capital in our country and that after all it is labour, their 
own labour which creates capital (Burma 1946, p.36).
On 6 June 1947 General Aung San convened a meeting of politicians 
and senior officials at 'Sorrento Villa'. The general purpose was to 
bring to an end the ' colonial economy' and to create a new socialist 
system.
4.2.1 The Land Nationalization Act and Co-operative Farms
The Constitution declares that the State shall have the right to 
resume possession of any land, and distribute the same for collective 
or co-operative farming or to agricultural tenants. The Land 
Nationalization Act 1948 was enacted in the year of independence and 
stipulated that farmers receiving land must form mutual aid teams and 
join co-operatives. The declared purpose of the Act was 'to put an end 
to landlordism and to usher in an era whose ultimate objective is 
collective farming' (Myint 1971, p.167). It was tried out only in one 
township, Syriam of Hanthawaddy District, where the experiment was an 
almost total failure. Furnivall, always a friendly commentator, 
attributed this failure to 'favouritism', 'mistakes', and 'bribery' 
(cited by Tinker 1968, p.229). Meanwhile the onslaught of the civil
war paralysed the whole machinery of agricultural production and 
marketing. Many farmers were forced to abandon their former routine of 
living in field huts to cultivate their more distant holdings. They 
found themselves often compelled to pay tribute to the rebels. 
Frequently in the more inaccessible areas, the paddy piled up for 
months on end because of the breakdown of communications and transport.
The Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League was a political party which 
fought for the country's independence.
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For the first three years after independence, the Government was fully 
occupied in fighting the civil war.
In 1953, when a measure of political stability was attained, a 
more detailed and expanded version of the Land Nationalization Act was 
passed in Parliament, and an effort was made at implementation. 
According to the programme, the redistribution of the 10 million acres 
would be completed by the end of 1955, and the farming families 
receiving a holding would then join together in mutual aid teams. As 
experience of co-operative methods was gained, every four mutual aid 
teams would be grouped together in agricultural producers' 
co-operatives. During the years 1956-62, the 200,000 mutual aid teams 
would have become 50,000 co-operatives. But even this would be a 
transitional phase. From 1954-55, producers' co-operatives would be 
grouped into collective farms of 800 to 1000 acres, and a complete 
revolution in Burmese agriculture would be accomplished (Tinker 1968, 
pp.240-241).
But, in practice, 3.4 million acres were resumed, 1.6 million 
acres were exempted and 1.4 million acres redistributed by the end of 
1957-58 (Burma 1959, p.79). It would take about 20 years to complete 
the programme and it was 'temporarily' suspended in 1958 'pending 
further analysis and study' (Myint 1971, p.171-174 ). The aim of 
establishing collective farming, which was part of the plan, was far 
from being attained. Co-operatives and mutual aid teams had indeed been 
formed in the nationalized areas, but they existed only on paper (Myint 
1971, p.173). There was inconsistency between what the Government
proclaimed and what it actually did. There seemed to be no
co-ordination between the Ministries of the Government, and when the 
Five Year Co-operative Plan was annouced in 1951 by the Ministry of 
Co-operatives, co-operative farming was found to have no place in it. 
The main reason for the suspension of the land nationalization 
programme may have been the half-hearted policy of the Government. This 
seems to show that a co-operative farming system can not be formed 
successfully without a bold effort by the Government.
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4.2.2 The Five Year Co-operative Plan and Agricultural Co-operatives
In July 1951 the Government summoned a National Convention on 
Co-operatives and a Co-operative Plan was presented to the conference. 
It put forward a series of broad proposals, including a marketing 
co-operative in each village, consumers' co-operatives in every town, 
industrial co-operatives, and a nation-wide organization to supervise 
their progress, with District Unions and a National Co-operative 
Council.
Under the Five Year Co-operative Plan almost every one of the 
12,000 village tracts in the country was to have a Proco (Agricultural 
Producers Co-operative) to service its members with finance, to supply 
consumer goods and agricultural inputs, to sell produce and to promote 
thrift. The original purpose of the co-operatives was the financing of 
agricultural loans. Crop loans, repayable in one year, and loans for 
cattle purchase, repayable in three or four years, were provided by the 
co-operatives. But the great majority of them were merely borrowing 
from the Government at 6.25 percent and issuing loans to their members 
at 12 percent for the cultivation of paddy. A few Procos borrowed from 
the Government and issued loans to their members at the mentioned rates 
for the purchase of cattle, but the total amounts involved were much 
smaller. From the foundation of the State Agricultural Bank (SAB) in 
1953, Procos borrowed from it at 6 percent. Members to whom loans were 
granted were required to sell their produce, up to an amount equal at 
least to the amount of the loan from the Proco. In addition to the 
co-operative loans, there were direct government loans under the 
Agriculturists' Loans Act (1947). Compared with the total of
Government loans for cultivation in the country as a whole the share of 
the co-operatives in the provision of credit was small, as is shown in 
the following table.
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Table 4-1 : Co-operative Loans and Total Government 
(Kyat* in millions)
Year Co
Loans
-operative
Returns
Total
Loans
Govt.
Returns
1950-51 4.0 3.5 29.4 13.6
1951-52 8.7 7.5 35.6 21 . 1
1952-53 13.9 12.5 55.9 50.5
1953-54 18. 0 15.7 54.3 38.9
1954-55 20.6 18.4 52.1 39.7
1955-56 20.7 18.5 42.8 35.7
1956-57 2 1.4 18.4 48.3 39.5
1957-58 11.2 10.8 46.0 40.9
1958-59 - - 56.4 49.6
1959-60 - - 73. 1 63.3
1960-61 - - 87.7 61.1
Notes: Co-operative loans from 1953-54 to 1957-58 include both 
direct loans and loans through the State Agricultural 
Bank.
*The Burmese Kyat equaled approximately US $ 0.167.
Sources: ILO 1955, p.82; and Burma 1958 & 1962, p.80 & p.96.
The recovery of loans issued through co-operatives was
considerably more than that of direct government loans, but less 
satisfactory when compared to village banks. This is shown in Table
4.2.
Village banks were established under the SAB in 1953, which 
thereby took over rural credit operations from co-operatives in 
1958-59. Direct government loans were also issued through the SAB. In 
fact co-operative loans constituted only 13.6 to 48.4 percent of total 
government loans during the period 1950-58. The surveys counducted by 
the Settlement Party in Pyapon, Maubin, and Pegu districts in 1952-54 
showed that about 98 percent of cultivators surveyed in these districts 
had to take loans of one kind or the other, and that 52 to 83 percent 
of total loans were from private sources (Burma 1956, p.578 & 588).
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Table 4-2: Co-op Loans, Direct Government Loans and
Vallage Bank Loans (Kyat in millions)
Year Co-operative Direct Govt. Village Bank
Loans Returns % Loans Returns % Loans Returns %
1950-51 4.0 3.5 87.5 25.4 10.1 39.8 - - -
1951-52 8.7 7.5 86.2 26.9 13.6 50.6 - - -
1952-53 13.9 12.5 89.9 42.0 38.0 90.5 - - -
1953-54 18. 0 15.7 87.2 35.0 21.9 62.6 1.3 1.3 100.0
1954-55 20.6 18.4 89.3 27.7 17.8 64.3 3.8 3.5 92.1
1955-56 20.7 18. 5 89.4 16.5 12.0 72. 1 5.6 5.2 92.6
1956-57 2 1.4 18.4 86.0 18.4 12.6 68.5 8.5 8.5 100.0
1957-58 11.2 10.8 96.4 22.9 18. 3 79.9 11.9 11.8 99.2
1958-59 - - - 27.4 21.0 76.6 29.0 28.6 98.6
1959-60 - - - 30.3 21.0 69.3 42.8 42.3 98.8
1960-61 - - _ 30.4 5. 1 16.8 57.3 56.0 98.7
Notes: As Table 4.1 
Sources: As Table 4.1
According to Myint, government loans for the 1950s, which were only for 
short term purposes, accounted for a meagre 16 to 18 percent of 
estimated needs (1971, p.181). If this is so, the contribution of
co-operative loans to agricultural needs was certainly small. The main 
weakness of co-operative credit was its entire reliance on government 
loans. The owned funds of the societies were small and they had not 
succeeded in attracting deposits to any sizable extent. Perhaps most of 
the farmers were too poor to save much or they took little interest in 
the co-operative movement due to unsatisfactory management and bitter 
experiences in the colonial days.
4.2.3 Co-operative Paddy and Rice Marketing
With the establishment of the State Agricultural Marketing Board 
(SAMB) as the sole agency for the export of Burmese rice and rice 
products, it became possible for the Procos to begin the joint sale of 
their members' paddy either as paddy or as rice. An experimental start
57
was made in 1951-52 in eight of the principal paddy-growing districts. 
The Procos in these districts collected the paddy of members and sold 
it to the SAMB depots through the District Unions. The District Unions 
advanced all of the incidental charges and paid out the sale proceeds 
promptly. The SAMB financed paddy marketing operations by District 
Unions with a loan of K 5 million (ILO 1955, p.83). The District
Unions charged a commission of K 5 per 100 baskets^ of paddy sold, half 
of which was returnable to the Procos concerned after 5 years. The 
District Unions could use the commissions as a portion of working 
capital before returning it to the Procos. The quantity of paddy sold 
in 1951-52 was over 1.7 million baskets (35.2 thousand metric tons), 
and in 1952-53, joint sale was extended to 22 districts. Joint sales of 
paddy by Procos and total government procurement from 1951-52 to 
1959-50 are shown in Table 4.3.
Table 4-3: Co-operative Sales and Total Govvernment Procurement of
Paddy (in thousand metric tons)
Year Co-op
Sale
Government
Procurement
Sales/Procurement
%
1951-52 35.2 2474 1.4
1952-53 99.2 3072 3.2
1953-54 177.5 2523 7.0
1954-55 274.2 25 19 10.9
1955-56 175.8 2489 7. 1
1956-57 10 1.1 2680 3.8
1957-58 69.3 2590 2.7
1958-59 92.7 3243 2.9
1959-60 23.1 2549 0.9
1960-61 n .a 3026 -
ces: BSPP 1970, p.310; U Tin Win 1983, p.27.
5 1 basket= 46 lbs
58
Co-operative sales as a proportion of government procurement
increased up to 1954-55 and decreased thereafter. This was partly
because of fluctuations in the level of production and unf avourabe
climatic conditions, and partly because of higher prices given by 
private traders. Especially in 1959-60 joint sale was conducted only in 
16 districts for these reasons. The Procos seemed to have the same 
defects as the Indian marketing societies which were mentioned in 
Chapter 3. In that year the commission charged by the District Unions 
was reduced from K 5 to 3 per 100 baskets of paddy sold. Some Procos 
milled the paddy in co-operative rice mills for sale as rice, and the 
number of these rice mills increased from 4 in 1952 to 12 in 1954. By 
comparison, the total number of rice mills in Burma was over 700 ( ILO 
1955, p.83), and as a whole the share of co-operatives in paddy 
marketing and milling was minimal.
It was prescribed that half of the commission charged by the 
District Unions was returnable to the Procos concerned after five 
years. There was, however, no clear record of this in the accounts of 
either the District Unions or the Procos. Joint sale transactions did 
not pass through the regular accounts of the co-operatives, and no 
patronage refunds were paid, although there was provision for it in the 
by-laws.^ After 1957-58, when the Procos could not provide credit to 
their members, and when the private traders gave higher prices, the 
members sold little produce to the Procos. According to the Report of 
the Union Land and Agricultural Planning Commission, much of the crop 
was still transferred from the cultivators to local shop-keepers, 
money-lenders and brokers, at the threshing floor, in settlement of 
existing debts. It might be concluded that the District Unions and the 
Procos acted as marketing agents for the SAMB rather than contributing 
to their members' welfare. This was the main weakness of the scheme 
which as a result failed to maintain the loyalty of members.* 7
Procos should have received their share of the commission
immediately, and should have in turn secured the loyalty of their
members by paying patronage refunds in respect of their transactions.
7Fundamentally, loyal support for the co-operative will depend on 
whether the co-operative society is meeting technical and/or economic 
needs.
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4.2.4 The Co-operative Cotton Marketing Scheme
The joint sale of cotton by Procos was begun in 1952-53, and a 
Co-operative Cotton Marketing Board was established in the same year. 
It was an ad hoc body with the sole right to export cotton from Burma 
and was financed by a government loan of K 28.5 million (ILO 1955, 
p .84). The District Unions in the cotton-growing districts received 
advances from this sum through the Union of Burma Co-operative 
Wholesale Society (UBCWS). The District Unions purchased and ginned 
cotton and sent it to the UBCWS, and cotton prices were fixed annually 
on the basis of expected export prices. The District Unions and UBCWS 
each charged a commission of K 5 per bale of 400 lbs, and the UBCWS 
also developed the Price Stabilization Fund from the surplus made from 
the sale of cotton. In 1959, the then Government changed its policy and 
the monopoly right of purchase and export was withdrawn from the UBCWS 
after which it had to compete with private traders in the purchase and 
export of cotton. In 1959-60 the private cotton exporters' share was 7 
thousand tons out of 15 thousand tons of total cotton exports. The 
co-operative had a tendency to rely more on Government patronage, which 
provided it with a monopoly position in the market. Cotton exports of 
the UBCWS are shown in Table 4.4.
During the period from late 1958 to early 1960, despite the drop 
in world cotton prices, the UBCWS stabilized the purchase price but at 
a loss of K 2.4 million paid out of the Price Stabilization Fund of K 
14.3 accumulated since 1952-53 (Burma 1960, p.492). Ideally, the
Co-operative Marketing Scheme had its base in the primary level of 
co-operatives comprising cultivators. It was said to aim at
eliminating the role of middlemen, beginning at the village level, and 
stabilizing purchased prices may mean protection of the cotton-growers' 
interest. But, according to the following remark made by the Union 
Land and Agricultural Planning Commission, the cotton-growers' interest 
may not be protected as intended.
From actual working experience gained in the marketing of 
this crop it has been observed that there are still defects 
existing at the level between cotton producers and the
Secondary Co-operative Societies. For instance, there still 
exists to a certain extent the middle-men who purchase the 
cotton from the producers and sell to the Co-operative Buying 
Depot (Burma 1956, p.620).
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Table 4-4: Cotton Exports by the UBCWS
Year Volume 
(000 tons) (K
Value
million)
1952-53 22 55
1953-54 18 50
1954-55 16 51
1955-56 20 44
1956-57 13 32
1957-58 8 17
1958-59 9 18
1959-60 8 16
1960-61 n .a n .a
Sources: BSPP 1970, p. 386; Burma 1957 & 1961, 
pp.35-36 & p.45.
Perhaps the cotton-growers could not fully enjoy the advantages 
provided by the UBCWS. The main weakness was the link between the
Qcotton-growers and the purchasing secondary co-operatives. According 
to Professor Myint, although he does not mention the Co-operative Plan, 
the only direct benefit which the Burmese peasants obtained from the 
earlier development plans was the subsidized agricultural loans which 
covered only about 16 percent of their total short-term credit 
requirements (1977, p.40). As a whole, the Five Year Co-operative Plan 
was not fully carried through as announced, but there was considerable 
development in the co-operative movement, even though its contribution 
to rural development was small.
This link could have been strengthened by strengthening the primary 
societies and by educating the members to understand the benefits of 
co-operation.
61
4.3 Lessons for Future Tasks
Under British administration, the co-operative movement aimed to 
free the small cultivator from his dependence on the money-lender. It 
failed to carry out this task and during the liquidation period every 
asset of defaulting members was seized and sold in persuance of the 
principle of unlimited liability of the society. In the minds of 
cultivators, the word 'co-operative' became synonymous with the worst 
kind of economic disaster (Hlaing, forthcoming). However, the 
co-operative movement was saved and reestablished on a sound footing by 
the rent purchase system. Thanks to the rent purchase system, the 
farmers got back their lands and the societies got back the loans. 
This shows how a policy is important in realizing the objectives of the 
co-operative movement. If the policy is not compatible with the 
prevailing situation there can be adverse effects instead of achieving 
positive objectives.
When Burma regained its independence the Government again aimed at 
eliminating landlords and middlemen by forming co-operatives. 
Co-operation appears to have been chosen on grounds of both equity in 
income distribution and social justice. It may partially be due to 
nationalism as most of the middlemen at that time were Indians and 
Chinese, and a vast majority of the Burmese people were poor and 
ignorant and seemed incapable of promoting their own welfare by 
individual efforts. The Government appeared to have come to the 
conclusion that the most effective means of achieving the economic and 
social development of the people was through the instrument of 
co-operation. Nevertheless, the main obstacle was the problem of 
finding good leadership, as the poverty and illiteracy of the rural 
masses inhibited emergence of local leadership of good quality.
In most co-operative societies the executive committee members had 
not only lost their interest in the welfare of the community but were 
quite often found exploiting their positions for their own economic and 
political ends. Local co-operative societies were quite often used as 
stepping-stones to higher positions in political and economic life. 
This problem of economic and political exploitation by insincere 
leaders had adversely affected the reputation of the co-operative 
movement. The people used to say as a political satire that the
62
co-operatives were formed not for their benefit, but for the benefit of 
the executive committee members. What was needed were primary
co-operatives with expanding memberships and competent management.
The deficiencies of the past can be avoided by an intensive
education programme and by watchful government policies. It will be
essential to develop the movement on a foundation of efficient and
effective primaries. In order to accomplish a good foundation of
primaries it will be necessary for the officers and staff of the 
Co-operative Department to establish more contact and close
supervision, combined with educational measures, in order that the 
society committees will be in a position to manage their respective 
societies in a proper manner. It is also hoped that the literacy 
campaign launched in 1964 (to achieve total literacy in the whole 
country by 1990 ) will be helpful in fostering good leadership in rural 
areas. As regards secondary societies, if they are actually to
represent the primaries it is important that any activities performed 
by the secondaries should be in the interests of the members of the 
primary societies, that is, the cultivators. However, past experiences 
highlight the necessity of emphasizing the education of people in 
co-operation and the strengthening of primary societies to achieve the 
goals of the co-operative movement.
63
CHAPTER 5
THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION AND THE CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT
On March 2 1962 the Revolutionary Council came to power and vowed 
reconstruct the social and economic life of all citizens through the 
Burmese Way to Socialism. The aim of the Revolutionary Council was to 
build a society of socialist justice in a socialist democratic state. 
In achieving the goal of socialism, the Revolutionary Council based its 
organization primarily on the strength of peasants and other working 
people. The constitution of the Burma Socialist Programme Party 
(Lanzin Party) was published and the Party was organized in July 1962. 
The Party remained a cadre party until 1971, when it was transformed 
into a mass national party.
5.1 The Socialist Revolution and the Peasants
The Revolutionary Council placed agrarian reform at the forefront 
of its activities. To formulate a programme for agrarian reform, 
Peasant Seminars were held at various points of the country from 1962 
to 1965. At the seminars the peasants commented and put forward 
suggestions on agriculture, husbandry, the land system, co-operative 
operations, social problems and so on. Representatives of the 
government departments gave replies or explanation. The seminars were, 
for the peasants, preliminary steps towards socialist democracy and 
were significant in providing opportunities for peasants to discuss the 
implementation of agricultural plans laid down by the Revolutionary 
Council. The seminars also gave the Revolutionary Council an
opportunity to hear the matters presented by the peasants themselves 
and thereby to make modifications or to accelerate execution of work in 
the interest of peasants. In fact, the seminars linked the peasants
t»H -t-Vi ar\T7Drnrri ont- .
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On March 2 1965, the delegates to the Peasant Seminar declared
their wish to see the rapid formation of the People's Peasant Councils
in order that they would be able to undertake their duties under the
leadership of the Party. People's Peasant Councils (after 1974 known 
as the peasant asiayones), which had been established by 1967, had by 
February 1980 a membership of 7.6 million in 268 of 314 townships 
throughout the nation and in over 13,000 wards and village tracts 
(Steinberg 1981, p.33). The duties of the Peasant Councils are to
build solidarity among the peasants and to help build such rural 
organizations as land committees, agricultural co-operatives and 
village bank committees. Their purpose is also to promote production 
and to enhance agriculture, husbandry and social services. The councils 
are open to all peasants and membership in the organization is not 
compulsory.
In addition to the above measures, all lands were declared to be 
owned by the State and the Revolutionary Council promulgated laws to 
improve the life of the peasants. The 1963 Tenancy Law, the 1963 
Tenancy rules, the 1963 Law Protecting the Rights of the Peasants and 
1965 Law Amending the Tenancy Law are the laws and rules which 
safeguard the interests of the peasants who work on the land. Since all 
lands were declared to be owned by the State, these laws and rules were 
in essence based on the right for peasants to work the land rather than 
to own the land. The 1963 Law Protecting the Rights of the Peasants 
prohibits the courts from attaching and seizing lands, animals and 
implements in payment of outstanding debts. The amendment to the 
Tenancy Act abolished all rents on farm lands and this legislation 
marked 'the destruction of the last line of landlordism' (BSPP 1966, p. 
83) . Land committees were set up to take action against the persons who 
broke the provisions of those laws. Local land committees are to decide 
land use and sales and to settle disputes in land ownership. Finally 
more agricultural loans were provided to the peasants to cover all 
their requirements.
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5.2 Importance of Co-operatives in the Socialist Revolution
As regards co-operatives, beginning in November 1962 the 
liquidation of bogus societies was carried out. Some societies were 
doing little work and others were operating on an unsound financial 
basis or on a non-cooperative basis. Up to October 1966, 2,224
agricultural co-operatives with a membership of 556,302 were 
liquidated. On the other hand, the Revolutionary Government made 
efforts to form new socialist co-operatives as a mode of socialist 
ownership of the means of production.
Some idea of the components of the economy prior to the 1970 
Co-operative Scheme can be derived from Table 5.1.
Table 5- 1: Value of Gross Output and Services in 1966-67
(Kyat in millions)
Sector Value Percentage
State 5660 38
Co-op 460 3
Private 8860 59
Total 14980 100
Source: BSPP 1974, p.172.
The table shows that the private sector constituted 59 percent of the 
value of gross output and services and dominated the national economy, 
while the state sector accounted for 38 percent and the co-operative 
sector 3 percent. In fact, this ownership ratio in gross output was 
true not only for 1966-67 but also for almost the whole decade before 
1970. Between 1963-64 and 1969-70, the share of the private sector in 
gross output made up between 55 percent and 64 percent of gross output, 
while the share of the state sector ranged from 35 to 41 percent and 
the co-operative sector from 1 to 4 percent. This indicates that the 
private sector, despite the socialist goals, continued to play a 
dominant role in the national economy. The dominant role of the private 
sector hampered the development of the planned economy; in particular, 
small-scale producers scattering in the economy caused difficulties in
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The socialist revolution was faced not only with the problem of 
socializing capitalist property by expropriating it but also with the 
problem of the socialist transformation of the property of small-scale 
producers. As expropriating the small-scale producers cannot be 
considered desirable, it was necessary to find a different means of 
drawing them into the socialist economy. Co-operatives provided such a 
means. The co-operative was regarded as the only socially-acceptable 
form of socializing small-scale producers. The co-operative was seen 
as a form of economic management which activates certain direct 
economic incentives by means of joint ownership. It was believed that 
these direct incentives could not be achieved to the same extent in an 
economy based on ownership by society as a whole. Further, the 
co-operative, because of the communal ownership of its property, can 
establish a firmer foundation of democratic economic management. 
Co-operative self-administration is the second specific feature of the 
co-operative movement. This feature also plays an important role in the 
process of constructing socialism as it means the participation of 
people in economic activities and decision-making. Therefore, the 
co-operative movement became a means whereby the small-scale sector 
could be integrated with the socialist economy. This is stated clearly 
in the Policy Declaration of the Revolutionary Council as follows:
In order to carry out socialist plans such vital means of 
production as agricultural and industrial production, 
distribution, transportation, communications, external trade, 
etc., will have to be nationalized. All such national means of 
production will have to be owned by the State or co-operative 
societies or collective unions. Amongst such ownership State 
ownership forms the main basis of socialist economy. State 
ownership means ownership by the whole nation itself, whereas 
ownership by co-operatives or collectives means group-ownership 
by respective concerns. But as all forms of ownership will 
have to operate within the framework of socialist national 
planning they are interdependent (Burma Socialist Programme 
Party 1963, p.45).
In accordance with the declaration, the co-operatives were 
required to implement the general economic and social tasks laid down 
by the socialist State. The consumers' co-operatives were formed in 
every ward of towns and cities and the village-tract co-operatives were 
formed in every village tract. Producers' co-operatives were formed in 
both agricultural and industrial sectors. Consumers' co-operatives and
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village-tract co-operatives are based on location and producers' 
co-operatives on function. These primary societies within the 
townships were organized into Township Co-operative Societies whose 
major functions have been marketing of agricultural and industrial 
products of their own member societies, procurement of goods and 
services on their behalf, and also to promote, educate and supervise 
the primary co-operatives. Even though the societies are to perform 
their activities under the guidance of the BSPP they are purely 
socioeconomic, not political, organizations. They are supposed to play 
a significant role in the implementation of the State's economic plans 
according to socialist economic principles and function within the 
socialist democratic framework. They will lend support to the State 
Economic Enterprises by drawing the small-scale producers into the 
socialist planned economy and promoting national production. By the 
incorporation of the co-operative movement into the general framework 
of socialist construction, co-operative ownership became a particular 
form of socialist ownership. Thus, the co-operative sector is 
designated in Burma as the second pillar of the socialist economic 
system, the State sector being the first pillar, and the goals of the 
co-operative societies are to be set for the building of the socialist 
economy. The central theme of the co-operative movement is to meet the 
basic needs and social requirements of the people on the most 
reasonable terms, which is one of the basic principles of socialist 
economy.
5.3 The 1970 Co-operative Scheme and its Role
In 1970, the Union of Burma Co-operative Societies Law and 
Regulations were promulgated with a view to bringing forth co-operative 
economic activities that contribute to the socialist system. A 
comprehensive Co-operative Scheme was also announced to reorganize the 
entire co-operative movement. Under the scheme, members of
co-operatives are to manage their own affairs and the active 
participation of all the members is expected. All business of the 
co-operatives is to be approved by the general meeting of the society, 
so that the members have to participate and decide their own course of 
action. Participation in the planning process has two facets. One is
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that the annual development programmes are to be discussed with the 
member farmers through their representatives at the special meeting 
held at the township level. The other aspect is the drawing up of 
annual local development programmes at the village level. At the annual 
meeting of the society, the executive committee is to put forward a 
list of future tasks and a plan of action which will have been drawn up 
with the help of the Township Co-operative Department. The most 
pressing problems and the ways to overcome them will be discussed and 
approved by the members. The main objectives of the 1970 Co-operative 
Scheme are as follows:
1. To distribute the legitimate benefits of the co-operatives 
to the producers of goods and to the consumers for their 
relief and welfare by doing away with the middle-man and the 
exploitation by him,
2. To encourage the Union citizens to carry on trade through 
co-operative societies rather than individually in 
accordance with the necessity to trade in groups for 
advancement of the national economy , and
3. To encourage the peasants and workers to take active parts 
in business by forming co-operatives (Burma 1982?, p.22).
In fact, it is a scheme which stresses the need for the promotion 
of the role of the peasants and workers in the nation's economy through 
the organizational force of the co-operatives. The challenge to stop 
exploitation is a strong motivation for formation of co-operatives. If 
the objectives of the scheme are realized income inequality in rural 
areas would be reduced to some extent and the participation of rural 
people in economic activity and decision-making would be increased. 
Rural development will certainly be advanced through co-operative 
activities. The Government's agricultural policy has been to evolve and 
experiment with a socialist form of agricultural production compatible 
with the political, organizational, and economic conditions of the 
country without any detriment to agricultural productivity (Hlaing, 
forthcoming).
In 1972 the Fourth Central Committee Meeting of the Burma 
Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) formulated the Long-term and
Short-term Economic Policies of the BSPP. Among them, the main 
agricultural co-operative policy was to set up successful pilot 
co-operative farms on an experimental basis wherever possible. In 1973
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the BSPP laid down its Twenty Year Long-term Economic Plan in which the 
State sector was to produce 48 percent, the co-operative sector 26 
percent and the private sector 26 percent of the GDP by the end of 
1993-94. This is shown in Table 5.2.
Table 5-2: The Twenty Year Long-term Plan Target of Shares in GDP 
by State, Co-operative, and Private Sectors (Percentage)
Sector Production Services Trade Total
State 39 67 54 48
Co-op 33 9 25 26
Private 28 24 21 26
Total 100 100 100 100
Source: U Tin Htun 1982, p .65 
The Twenty Year Plan of the BSPP for co-operative sector is shown
in Appendix Table 1. In the Twenty Year Plan, the co-operatives are
expected to share more fully, by the end of 1993-94, in 14 of the 17 
sectors of the national economy. In production targets, the 
co-operatives are to produce 50 percent of total production in 
agriculture, 50 percent in livestocks and fishery, 10 percent in 
forestry, 5 percent in mining, 20 percent in processing and
manufacturing, 5 percent in power and 10 percent in construction. In 
service sectors, co-operatives are to have a 10 percent share in 
transportation, 5 percent in financial institutions, 20 percent in 
social services and 10 percent in rentals and other services. Finally 
in the trade sector, co-operatives are to have 25 percent of internal 
wholesale trade and 40 percent of internal retail trade. As 
agriculture is the mainstay of the national economy co-operatives will 
fail to meet the overall target of 26 percent of GDP unless they meet 
the 50 percent target in agriculture. In fact, it is a greater task 
for agricultural co-operatives since the small-holding system is still 
predominant in agriculture. The position of peasant families and land 
area cultivated is shown in Table 5.3. According to Table 5.3, 97.3
percent of peasant families are found to be working holdings under 20 
acres, which together make up 85.2 percent of the total cultivated
70
area. In fact, they are the target groups of the co-operative farming 
movement.
Table 5-3: Position of Peasant Families and Land Area Cultivated
(1983-84)
Size of holding Numbers (000 ) Percentage
Peasants Acres Peasants Acres
Under 5 acres 2643 6083 61.4 25. 1
5 to 10 acres 1045 7478 24.2 30.9
10 to 20 acres 505 7068 11.7 29.2
20 to 50 acres 112 2991 2.6 12.4
50 to 100acres 2 126 ( 0.6
(0.1
100 and above 1 446 ( 1.8
Total 4308 24192 100.0 100.0
Notes: Agricultural societies are included in the peasant 
families. Land area cultivated includes cultivated and 
fallow lands.
Source: Burma 1984, p.38.
5.4 Types of Agricultural Co-operatives
Under the 1970 Co-operative Scheme, there are three main types of 
agricultural co-operatives; agricultural producers' co-operatives, 
village-tract co-operatives, and co-operative farms. The agricultural 
producers' co-operatives are supply societies. They mainly supply 
animal feed. All farmers in the area are eligible for membership. The 
village-tract co-operatives are multi-purpose co-operatives. They 
function like consumers' co-operatives as well as producers' 
co-operatives. Their main functions are supplying consumer goods and 
farm inputs, making available tractors, water pumps and other farm 
implements to member farmers, marketing of agricultural produce, 
undertaking agricultural and livestock farming activities, and 
providing other social services. Almost every aspect of rural life is 
affected by the activities of this type of society in one way or 
another. The heads of families permanently residing in the area are
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eligible for membership of village-tract co-operatives. From 1970 to 
1974, stress was laid on the formation of village-tract co-operatives 
which were then required to facilitate the flow of consumer goods in 
the country.
Since 1974 co-operative farming has been actively encouraged. 
With a view to implementing the Twenty Year Long-term Plan, the 
Ministry of Co-operatives sent survey teams to all parts of the country 
to investigate and assess the feasibility of organizing co-operative 
farms. In accordance with the reports submitted by the survey teams, 
the Ministry of Co-operatives, in consultation with the allied 
Ministries and authorities, adopted the Pilot Project for Co-operative 
Farming in 1977. It aims to modernize agriculture and practise 
scientific methods of cultivation.
The pilot project emphasises establishing co-operative farms on 
cultivable waste land. There were 21,290 thousand acres of cultivable 
waste land and 5,233 thousand acres of fallow land in 1979-80 (Burma 
1984, p. 37). In addition to former state colonies and alluvial 
islands, cultivable waste land and land reclaimed as a result of state 
irrigation works were proposed for co-operative agriculture. The main 
method of the pilot project to establish co-operative farming is 
persuasion of the farmers through demonstration of its advantages. 
Pilot co-operative farms were set up to demonstrate the advantages of 
co-operative farming to the farmers of the area and thus to act as 
catalytic agents for further expansion. If the farmers voluntarily 
surrender their individual rights of holding, these areas under 
cultivation can also be organized as co-operative farms. However, most 
of the co-operative farms are established on virgin lands on a 
voluntary basis. Where a group desires this form of undertaking it is 
given every encouragement. The progress of agricultural co-operatives 
is shown in Appendix Table 2.
Among the three types of agricultural co-operatives, the 
village-tract co-operatives have the largest membership. As these 
societies have been functioning for over ten years their members are 
expected to be acquainted with the workings of democratic institutions 
and good leadership is likely to be available. in these If the 
government lends its active support (for example by providing loans and
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required machinery) much can be expected of them for the co-operative 
farming movement.
As regards pilot co-operative farms, their number is increasing 
but at a very slow rate. Their membership apparently increased between 
1978-79 and 1980-81; but it fell slightly after then, even though the 
number of societies increased. This indicates that while new societies 
are being formed some members are voluntarily withdrawing from the 
existing societies. This may be due to severe hardships and low 
productivity. Since most co-operative farms are established on virgin 
land they are usually remote from any town or village. Great efforts 
are needed to clear the land, and supplies of electricity and water for 
irrigation are non-existent or very costly. Transport is very primitive 
too. The members are required to put up with severe hardships until 
local conditions become more favourable to them. Co-operative farms on 
virgin land demand more capital, knowledge, and unity. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, the voluntary co-operative farms may have to be reorganized 
as a result of withdrawals and it may become impossible for them to set 
long-term targets for investments or production.
Co-operative farming is still in its infancy and has not taken 
firm root. In 1983-84 the number of co-operative farm members 
constituted only 2.3 percent of total peasant families. Co-operative 
principles may have little significance among peasants who are 
inadequately prepared either through education, tradition or experience 
for the implied responsibilities. These principles must be backed by 
the convincing evidence of superior performance.
5.5 Functions of Agricultural Co-operatives
Although there are different forms of agricultural co-operatives 
under the 1970 Co-operative Scheme, the main idea of each form is to 
promote agricultural production and to improve rural living conditions. 
They are not intended to be mere co-operative shops selling consumer 
goods and fertilizers at reduced prices. In addition to the services 
the co-operatives extend to their members, they are seen and used as 
institutions through which the economic and social policies of the 
state can be implemented. All agricultural co-operatives are
socio-economic organizations whose basic task is economic development
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which in turn will bring forth the social services and amenities 
associated with the members' higher standard of living. They are to aim 
at all-round development in rural areas in accordance with BSPP 
guidelines and principles. Even some of the agricultural producers' 
co-operatives which are defined as supply societies are now undertaking 
farming activities. The major functions of each type of agricultural 
co-operative are reviewed in the following subsections.
5.5.1 Co-operative Agricultural Production
According to the requirements of the 1970 Co-operative Scheme, 
co-perative societies are to take up functions directly in the sphere 
of agricultural production as follows:
1. To carry out mutual aid on a voluntary basis wherever 
possible,
2. To undertake farming activities, sharing benefits in 
accordance with individual contributions, in such special 
areas as alluvial islands,
3. To undertake farming activities in such areas as 
government-reclaimed lands and state colonies, sharing 
benefits in accordance with individual contributions (Burma 
1970, p.6).
Nevertheless, emphasis was laid on commodity distribution until 
1973-74 when the BSPP laid down its Twenty Year Long-term Plan. After 
1973-74 a few village-tract co-operatives began to voluntarily take up 
functions directly in the sphere of agricultural production. In the 
by-laws of the village-tract co-operatives, one of the main tasks to be 
carried out by them is 'to produce agricultural and farm produce, 
marine products, animal and animal products and other related goods 
according to the plans or through consultation with State organizations 
concerned' (Burma 1972, p.2). In spite of this provision, the sown
areas of co-operatives were too small to be significant before 1975-77 
when the pilot co-operative farms were introduced on an experimental 
basis. This is consistent with the argument in Chapter 2 that the 
spontaneous transformation of simple forms of co-operation into 
co-operative farms can not be expected even though seme especially 
progressive co-operatives have been taking up functions directly in the 
sphere of agricultural production. Most peasants have been unwilling to 
pool their land (which is technically owned by the State). They have a
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sentimental attachment to their land and are not convinced of the 
material benefits of co-operative farming. Only State initiative and 
local leadership can give momentum to co-operative farming.
Sown area and agricultural production of co-operatives began to be 
relatively significant after 1976-77. Comparison of total sown area in 
agriculture and sown area of co-operatives from 1976-77 to 1983-84 is 
shown in Table 5.4.
Table 5-4: Total Sown Area in Agriculture and Sown Area of
Co-operatives (thousand acres)
Year Total Sown Area Sown Area of Co-ops Percent
1976-77 23163 17 0.07
1977-78 23579 210 0.89
1978-79 24368 245 1.01
1979-80 23304 317 1.36
1980-81 24805 315 1.27
1981-82 25123 668 2.66
1982-83 24488 868 3.54
1983-84 25208 1065 4.22
Sources: Burma 1984, p. 10; Hlaing, forthcoming.
The table indicates that there was a jump in the sown area of the 
co-operatives between 1976-77 and 1977-78, and then a gradual increase 
up to 1980-81. After 1980-81 there was rapid increase in sown area of 
co-operatives. The average annual rate of increase of area sown by 
co-operatives was 14.5 percent between 1977-78 and 1980-81 and 50.1 
percent between 1980-81 and 1983-84. The rapid increase in sown area of 
co-operatives after 1980-81 was due to the two-pronged approach adoped 
by the Ministry of Co-operatives. The first method was to form 
integrated co-operative farm and the second method was to organize 
small farmers in the existing village-tract co-operatives to 
participate in the co-operative farming movement. Until 1980-81, the 
co-operative farming movement stressed establishing co-operative farms
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on cultivable waste land. After then, the authorities concerned came 
to realize that it was hard to meet the target set in the Twenty Year 
Plan only by establishing co-operative farms on cultivable waste land 
and that it was necessary to revitalize the village-tract co-operatives 
as production units. This indicates that the traditional attitudes of 
the peasants were not rigid and inflexible; with proper education, 
guidance and motivation, they were capable of adopting a novel 
institution such as co-operative farming. Without successfully drawing 
the majority of small farmers into the co-operative farming movement it 
would be impossible to make rapid progress in the movement.
Even though the rate of increase of co-operative sown area became 
impressive after 1980-81, the co-operative share in total sown area in 
agriculture was not considered satisfactory. It accounted for only 4.2 
percent of total sown area in 1983-84. The majority of the land is 
under individual private ownership and management. As a result, the 
economy of small-holders is still economically dominant. The
contribution to the value of agricultural net output by ownership is 
shown as Appendix Table 3. Even in 1983-84 the co-operative share 
constituted only 2.6 percent of the value of agricultural net output. 
This was too small to meet the target set in the Twenty Year Plan. 
Taking an optimistic point of view, this indicates that the authorities 
concerned did not blindly chase the target figure and lends support to 
the view that the movement was based on the voluntary participation of 
farmers.
When we compare the co-operative share of total sown area and 
co-operative share in contribution to the value of the agricultural net 
output, as in Table 5.5, the latter is found to be less than the 
former. This suggests that agricultural productivity on co-operative 
farms in not as high as on individual farms. This is mainly due to the 
fact that most co-operative farms are established on cultivable waste 
land and fallow land. Naturally, these types of land are not as 
fertile as land already under cultivation. They also have deficiencies 
such as lack of water for irrigation, discussed above. Pooled land 
also is found to be generally of poor quality or uneconomic.
Good leadership and material incentives are required to attract 
more and more farmers to participate in the movement. Co-operative
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Table 5-5: Comparison of Shares in Total Sown Area and Value of
Agricultural Net Output by Co-operatives (percentage)
Year Share in Total 
Sown Area
Share in Value 
of Net Output
1976-77 0.1 0.1
1977-78 0.9 0.4
1978-79 1.0 0.9
1979-80 1.4 1 . 1
1980-81 1.3 1.1
1981-82 2.7 2. 1
1982-83 3.5 2.3
1983-84 4.2 2.6
Sources: As Table 5.4 and Appendix Table 3.
farms have to rely on good management and modern technology to increase 
agricultural productivity in order that they can attract more farmers. 
Even though the overall agricultural productivity of co-operatives 
seems to be unsatisfactory, some co-operative farms have claimed State 
awards for their exemplary performances in the production of crops. For 
example, Myindaw Village Co-operative Farm at Wetlet township in 
Sagaing Division claimed the Division's hero prize with a yield of 56 
baskets of dhal (gram) from an acre in 1980-81 , the Division's second 
prize with 55 baskets in 1981-82 and the FAO prize with 112 baskets for 
1982-83. Thanks to the scientific methods the society applied, the 
yield from the farm had shot up from 40-60 baskets per acre to over 100 
baskets per acre.  ^ Such societies succeeded in bringing about 
extensive as well as intensive utilization of land. Nevertheless, the 
proportion of the societies using the land extensively and intensively 
has been small. In 1982-83, 1,481 agricultural co-operatives in 221
11 basket of gram=69 lbs.
77
townships had taken up activities directly in the sphere of 
agricultural production. The different types of agricultural
co-operatives undertaking co-operative farming activities in 1982-83 by 
State/Division are shown as Appendix Table 4. Co-operative farms must 
be a new type of farm, of greater size and of stronger financial and 
economic structure, in which appropriate and effective use can be made 
of modern technical achievements. However, most co-operative farms 
appear to have failed to take full advantage of their large scale and 
appear to have experienced management disadvantages. Myanma
Agricultural Bank observed that, except for a few, many of its client 
farm co-operatives could not function at all as described in the 
project proposals that had been submitted along with loan applications
(Hlaing, forthcoming). The terms of long-term loans ranged from three
to ten years, depending on the purposes. For example, the term is up to
10 years for building of production premises while it is only up to
three years for perennial crops. However, of 34 co-operative farms 
which received long-term credits from the Bank only 8 had repaid the 
loans by the due date. Out of 7.5 million kyats actually provided, 
only 3.3 of the 5.6 million kyats due for repayment were repaid, 
therefore, in September 1984, overdue loans of co-operative farms 
amounted to 2.3 million kyats. Some of the societies were faced with 
yearly losses.
Nevertheless, from the economic point of view, a fact of major 
importance is that co-operative agriculture began to develop 'mixed 
farming , that is farming which avoided exclusive dependence on one or 
two crops and instead branched out into various directions to combine 
several types of product, for instance, intensive agriculture 
(vegetables, pig breeding) alongside grain growing. The present 
multiple cropping patterns can be summarised in four groups: multiple 
cropping before paddy such as pre-monsoon jute, early sesamum, and 
pre-monsoon cotton (long staple); multiple cropping after paddy such as 
groundnuts, sunflowers, pulses and maize; multiple cropping in dry land 
with or without irrigation such as pulses after early sesamum, wheat 
after early sesamum, cotton after onion, and late sesamum after maize; 
and mixed cropping such as groundnuts and pigeon peas, pigeon peas and 
cotton (short staple) and sesamum and peas (Hlaing, forthcoming). The
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co-operatives are cultivating over 20 kinds of crops including paddy, 
groundnut, sesamum, and wheat as major crops and the others as minor 
crops. Yearly production of various crops by the agricultural 
co-operatives from 1976-77 through 1982-83 is shown in Appendix Table 
5. In addition, in 1983-84 12 co-operative farms were engaged in 
inland fisheries, 3 in production and marketing of marine fish, and 14 
in production and marketing of fish from fish ponds. Although accurate 
information is not available, it is certain that many societies were 
also undertaking livestock farming activities under the guidance of the 
BSPP. Mixed farming represents a new type of farm management which 
promises important advantages for Burmese agriculture in general and 
co-operative members in particular. A farm with several branches can 
contribute significantly to the income of the farmers. It is less
vulnerable to trends of slump and prosperity and increases economic 
stability. Mixed farming also helps with the solution of a number of 
problems such as the provision of steady employment all the year round, 
and the supply of agricultural produce for home consumption on farms.
5.5.2 Co-operative Modernization of Agriculture
One of the main arguments for co—operativization is modernization 
of agriculture. By the term 'modernization of agriculture' we mean the 
application of modern, scientific methods in agriculture including 
mechanization. As sown acreage has increased more and more, especially 
the multiple cropping area,^ it has been necessary to use more
tractors, power tillers and water pumps. Machinery is needed to save 
time and enable rapid cultivating, planting and harvesting of a field 
in the multiple cropping system. The co-operative farming movement 
provided a means for diminishing large-scale ownership by individuals 
without sacrificing the advantages of large production units which were 
essential for the application of modern technology. Moreover, the 
village-tract co-operatives bridged the gap between small units and 
modern technology by hiring tractors, water pumps and other farm
implements to their members. Tractors, water pumps and other farm
implements owned by the co-operatives are shown in Appendix Table 6.
2Mixed and multiple cropping area rose from 2826 thousand acres (12.6 
percent of total sown area) in 1970-71 to 4253 thousand acres (17.15 
percent of total sown area) in 1980-81.
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In 1981-82, out of 9285 tractors owned by the Agricultural 
Mechanization Department and the co-operative societies, the number of 
tractors used for agriculture was 6128 which tilled 2418 thousand 
acres. The proportion of acres tilled by the tractors to the net sown 
area was only 5.7 3 percent in 1981-82. It appears that tractors and 
other implements were being used not to substitute for labour and 
draught animals, but to help farmers do better, heavier and faster work 
in agriculture. The slow rate of expansion in number of co-operative 
tractors and other implements is consistent with this.
Table 5-6: Comparison of Tractors and Draught Cattle used
in Agriculture
Year Tractors (No) Draught Cattle
Co-op State Total (000 )
1970-71 1533 6365 7898 4150
1971-72 1970 6265 8235 4201
1972-73 2495 6265 8760 4230
1973-74 2759 4186 6945 4206
1974-75 3021 4186 7207 50 18
1975-76 3335 4386 7721 5087
1976-77 3450 4912 8362 5180
1977-78 3570 4603 8173 5333
1978-79 3708 4953 8661 5564
1979-80 3731 5542 9273 5734
1980-81 3754 4525 8279 5950
1981-82 3785 4743 8528 6137
1982-83 3787 5400 9187 6259
1983-84 3813 5500 9313 6491
Note: The 
shown
number of 
the same
tractors owned 
in 1972-73 as
by the State 
1971-72, and
1974-75 as 1973-74 due to lack of data.
Sources: Burma, Various issues of Report to The Pyithu 
Hluttaw; Hlaing, forthcoming.
Table 5.6 shows that the number of tractors and the number of
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draught cattle used in agriculture was increasing year after year. If 
the tractors were substituting significantly for draught cattle and 
labour, the number of cattle would obviously drop. This was not the 
case. The process of mechanization seems to have been too slow to keep 
up with increasing sown area. Draught cattle still played a major role 
in cultivation. The process of mechanization does not seem to have 
aggravated the rural unemployment problems in Burma. Instead, it 
improved the intensity of cultivation and perhaps increased labour use. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, of the two effects of technological policy, 
emphasis seems to have been laid on the additive effect rather than on 
the substitutive effect in mechanizing Burmese agriculture.
It is true that the creation of large operational units demands 
investments in labour-displacing mechanization. Because of biological 
nature of agricultural production processes, operations are spread out 
in time and space. Managers of large operational units often find it 
attractive to use capital-intensive technologies to minimize the 
problems of supervising a large work force. But the co-operative 
movement in Burma seems to have minimized that problem by decentralized 
decision-making. In the case of societies with large membership, each 
section of work is entrusted to a separate sub-committee; in societies 
in which membership is small, each member is assigned seme 
responsibility with a view to developing initiative and leadership and 
to ensuring actual participation in in the work. According to Hlaing 
(forthcoming), there will be overseers and section leaders of the 
production units even in the Advanced Agricultural Producers' 
Co-operatives which are being planned for the near future. Techniques 
chosen may be labour-intensive for a considerable period of time. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, in co-operative farming societies, the members 
gain greater control over the type of technology that will be used and 
they are more likely to preserve employment opportunities for 
themselves and their children.
Although adequate information is not available, the slow rate of 
mechanization supports this claim. Co-operative farming seems to 
encourage application of modern agricultural practices based on 
biological-chemical innovations rather than mechanization. Its other 
main technique of improving production is to reorganize farm labour
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(Hlaing, forthcoming). The State also encourages the application of 
modern scientific methods in agriculture rather than mechanization. In 
Burma, higher yields per acre for paddy, dhal, groundnuts, etc. were 
achieved mainly by the switch from the traditional methods to 
scientific methods. Eleven winners of FAO prize for higher crop yields 
in 1983, including Myindaw Co-operative Farm, stated that they achieved 
higher yields from their farms by the application of modern scientific 
methods (Mg Thet Zaw (Mingaladon) 1983, p.18).
Among the improved practices, the use of chemical fertilizers and 
improved seeds were by far the most important. Chemical fertilizers 
were procured not only locally but also from abroad. In 1983-84, 
farmers used a total of 406 thousand metric tons of chemical 
fertilizers (Burma 1984, p.33) and almost all of these were distributed 
through the agricultural co-operatives. The amount of cattle manure 
was inadequate to the farmers' requirements and the need for chemical 
fertilizers was imperative. The co-operatives ensured fair
distribution among the farmers. As regards seeds, the farmers usually 
reserved enough seeds out of their produce. But when the need arose for 
purchasing seeds the societies would join the Township Co-operative 
Society and receive the required seeds. Quality seeds such as high
yielding varieties were also often distributed through the
co-operatives. In addition, some co-operatives were found to be 
undertaking storage of improved seeds (Hlaing, forthcoming). A
specific and separate cultivation of seed was entrusted to suitable 
member farmers and the seeds so obtained were stored in domestic
containers which were sealed to prevent damage through moisture, 
contamination and pests.
However, co-operative mechanization of agriculture is found to be 
unsatisfactory. Utilization of co-operative tractors and water-pumps is 
shown in Appendix Table 7 and 8. Even though the number of tractors 
owned by co-operatives increased from 804 in 1970-71 to 3813 in
1983-84, the number of idle tractors also increased rapidly. The number 
of idle tractors rose from 4.2 percent of total tractors in 1970-71 to 
40.8 percent in 1983-84. In co-operative societies, training was not 
sufficient for proper maintenance and minor repairs. In addition, 
diesel oil became a major constraint in the running of tractors, and
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spare parts were not readily available even at the tractor stations of 
the Agricultural Mechanization Department. Several varieties of spare 
parts were required and foreign exchange may be a limiting factor.
As a result, total tillage acres dropped year after year and the 
tillage rate fluctuated from 43 acres to 443 acres per tractor. The 
fall in tillage acre per tractor was partly due to the use of tractors 
other than in agriculture. In 1982-83, the co-operative tractors 
tilled only 98,960 acres, and, out of the total income of 13.7 thousand 
Kyats, 3.2 thousand Kyats (23.7 percent) was from agriculture and the 
rest was from non-agriculture. Although the tillage acre per tractor 
was decreasing, income per tractor is found to be increasing, from 
4,073 Kyats in 1970-71 to 6,549 Kyats in1983-84. This was partly due to 
higher charges and partly due to non-agricultural income.
The co-operative water-pumps were in the same situation as 
tractors. The number of idle water-pumps increased from 3.6 percent of 
total water-pumps in 1970-71 to 22.3 percent in 1983-84 and used hours 
per pump fluctuated from 19 hours to 318 hours. In 1982-83, 
co-operative water-pumps irrigated 64,675 acres, and out of the total 
income of the water pumps only 1.7 thousand Kyats (36.8 percent) was 
from agriculture. To modernize agriculture, it was necessary to make 
more efficient use of existing tractors and water-pumps on one hand and 
to procure more tractors and water-pumps on the other. The 
cost-effectiveness of mechanized agriculture in the co-operative sector 
under present conditions needs examination. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
the tendency for small farms to have an efficiency advantage over large 
farms may be offset by 'differentiating factors' such as a policy 
environment in which co-operative farms have access to credit and 
tractors at artificially low prices. But the concentration of scarce 
resources of capital, foreign exchange, and trained manpower in a 
sub-sector of co-operative farms should not be achieved at the expense 
of depriving the great majority of the farm population of inputs and 
supporting services.
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5.5.3 Co-operative Marketing of Agricultural Produce
The success of agriculture as a business, or the money returns 
from the year's operations, depends not only upon the quantity of 
produce, but also on the cost of production and the sale value 
realised. The village-tract co-operatives help in securing for the 
farmers as large a money return as pssible. According to the 
instructions of the Co-operative Department, the societies can contract 
individual farmers to sell their products and can advance up to 70 
percent of the contracted value, which means an advance purchase. 
Advances are to be paid three times; at the time of contract a payment 
of 40 percent of contracted value can be made on sown acreage, another 
15 percent on plantation and a final 15 percent on harvest. The full 
amount is to be paid out when the total contracted quantity is 
delivered. But in practice , before 1979-80, most contracts were made 
after crops were planted. The main reason was that the Township 
Co-operative Societies contracted from the primary co-operatives late 
to avoid losses as far as possible which might occur by the failure of 
crops. The link between the agricultural co-operatives and the 
secondary Township Co-operatives was weak and as a consequence the link 
between the primary societies and their members were also weak. Most 
members were reluctant to sell their produce to the society.
The private traders from the towns have been touring the villages 
to buy crops, especially groundnuts, sesamum and wheat. They usually 
offer slightly higher prices than the contracted prices of the society 
and they are prepared to take both good and bad quality stock, whereas 
the societies endeavour to maintain the standard of the produce. 
Working hours and the rules of co-operatives are more rigid than those 
of the traders. Though the traders may be exploiters they are 
courteous. The personal relationship between the trader and the
farmers is also a reason for their success. In some areas, trader's 
storage facilities and transportation are better. Concerned with 
immediate profits, members are apt to feel that they are not benefiting 
by co-operative crop procurement. In fact, to provide competition,
co-operatives must be at least as efficient as private concerns in the 
same field. On the other hand, the best basis for success in 
co-operative marketing is a membership which really understands what
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the society is trying to do and which is prepared to be loyal to it. 
Moreover, in the absence of co-operative societies, traders would not 
offer prices as high as in the existence of the societies. We can 
therefore say that the co-operatives have increased the bargaining 
power of farmers.
Rice procurement and marketing is a state monopoly in Burma. 
However, the co-operatives buy paddy, store, mill, and resell rice in 
localities not covered by the State Economic Enterprises. For example, 
all paddy buying in the Shan State are undertaken by co-operatives. In 
addition, some co-operatives purchase rural products to fulfil the 
industrial needs of the State sector. Some indicators are cutch for oil 
well drilling, bamboo for paper making, wheat and dhal (gram). This has 
increased employment and income of rural people in the respective 
areas.
In the last decade, co-operatives have usually been able to 
purchase less than half of planned value, as shown in Appendix Table 9. 
Co-operative crop procurement for selected major crops in 1982-83 is 
also shown in Appendix Table 10. The co-operatives have been buying 
over 20 kinds of crops, depending local production. As regards crop
procurement, the primary societies have mainly relied on the 
initiatives of the Township Co-operative Societies. The Township 
Co-operative Societies had some deficiencies to overcome. In those 
societies, co-operative leadership lacked commercial knowledge and 
business acumen. Individual undertakings almost disappeared under the 
name of collective leadership. The use of price mechanism was often 
neglected. The lack of transportation and storage facilities was also a 
serious problem for the co-operatives. The situation was aggravated by 
the failure of the co-operatives to provide rural people with the 
industrial products for which they showed a particular preference. 
Moreover, the Township Co-operative Societies often opened their own 
buying depots ignoring the vitality of the existing village-tract 
co-operatives. Consequently individual contracts of the village
societies were dishonoured (Hlaing,forthcoming).
But since 1979-80, the township co-operatives have been instructed 
to do business mainly through the primary co-operatives, which in turn 
deal with individual members. In addition, the societies have been
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guided to approach farmers, well before planting, with the offer of 
necessary inputs, both direct and indirect. The cash and commodity 
requirements of the members are to be met beforehand. A floating price 
system has been also adopted to benefit the farmers. Under this system, 
initial price guarantees the cost of production plus a reasonable 
profit margin, and as prevailing prices fluctuates the co-operatives 
are required to adjust their own to match. In addition, profits are to 
be shared at 25 percent each between the township society and the 
primaries and the rest is to be refunded to the member farmers on the 
basis of their crop delivery.
However, much remains to be settled in the co-operative marketing 
of agricultural produce. Business and financial management have to be 
disseminated down to the primary level and put into actual practice. 
More storage and transportation facilities will have to be provided 
wherever necessary and processing plants need to be installed to enable 
farmers to benefit from finished goods prices instead of raw material 
prices. Vertical integration of agricultural produce production, 
procession and marketing is found to be still weak. The principle of 
sharing profits from finished products (such as the cooking oil, wheat 
flour) between the societies and the members who delivered the crops 
was not implemented in full. To attract more farmers, they must fully 
benefit from the floating price system. On the other hand, the 
co-operatives should try to distribute more industrial products by 
joining industrial producers' co-operatives. In this way they can offer 
the peasants an inducement to increase production and salable surplus. 
The peasants will certainly respond positively to economic incentives."^
5.5.4 Supplying Consumer Goods and Agricultural Inputs
Village-tract co-operatives were formed mainly for the purpose of 
enabling rural people to purchase all of their requirements at low 
cost. After scxne years of experience of direct government distribution, 
co-operatives were given responsibility by the Government in 
distributing essential commodities. In 1970, the Trade Council closed 
down Township Trade Shops and handed over retail distribution of
JAs regards 
pp.31-33.
the mechanics of peasant expansion* see Myint, 1977,
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imported goods and State factory products to the co-operatives, 
including rice distribution. To ensure fair distribution of goods and 
services, for both producers and consumers, the government has relied 
heavily on the co-operative movement.
But most village-tract co-operatives were distributing only 
specified quotas of goods to rural consumers. They purchased goods 
including farm implements from the State outlets through Township 
Co-operatives and redistributed them to their members. Since 1979-80, 
there have been improvements in the working methods and styles of the 
societies. In commodity distribution, the majority of societies have 
progressed from the stage of merely retailing State-supplied 
commodities and to a point where they can obtain necessary goods on 
their own and distribute them to consumers. A considerable number of 
societies have managed to find and distribute more supplies of basic 
food stuff and commodities needed for the kitchen, such as fish sauce, 
dried chilli and spices. Active societies have not only opened and run 
shops but have also gone round making house-to-house sales. Such 
undertakings have been greeted well by the consuming public. As there 
are still private shop-keepers, the societies must try to be at least 
as efficient as their competitors.
Village societies purchase most goods in large lots at wholesale 
rates from the township co-operative societies and the private 
producers and then sell them to their members in small lots at retail 
rates. The difference between the the wholesale and the retail prices 
is later passed on to members after expenses are met. This refund 
usually accrues to members at the end of the year, after the annual 
meeting. Members of some societies are putting back their rebates and 
refunds on purchase into the societies as shares. Appendix Table 11 
(in nominal terms) shows that share capital, trading capital and 
turnover of the societies have been increasing year after year.
Besides consumer goods, chemical fertilizers, animal feeds, seeds 
and farm implements are also distributed by the societies. Distribution 
of chemical fertilizers and seeds has been mentioned above. Animal 
feeds generally distributed are bran, prawn dust and broken oil cakes. 
In the case of farm implements, distribution is restricted largely to 
the implements such as the iron ploughs and shares. But small tools
87
and appliances such as knives, sickles, and ropes are also available 
from the societies. If charges for fertilizers, improved tools and 
other factors of production remain high, the full effects of other 
policies favourable to farm production and rural prosperity can not be 
achieved. The co-operative movement has made good headway in rural 
retail trade.
But retail trade is found to be more difficult in rural areas than 
in urban ares due to the buying habits of rural people. Rural consumers 
buying habits, which have been conditioned for decades by the private 
traders, involve taking goods on credit and paying for them by 
delivering quantities of rural produce from time to time. Furthermore, 
goods are not purchased by weight or volume but in terms of quantities 
of money. For example, a person asks for 2 Kyats worth of cooking oil 
rather than 10 ticals (one-tenth of a viss) even though a viss of 
cooking oil must cost 20 Kyats. This leads to considerable 
over-charging by private shop-keepers. For private shop-keepers, even 
when weights or measures are used, there is systematic cheating by 
giving short weight or inferior quality. The co-operative shops 
therefore have not only to educate people to buy for cash but they have 
to make effective propaganda to convince consumers that they offer 
better services, quantitatively and qualitatively. The real income of 
farmers should therefore be greater even if the level of expenditure 
remains the same.
If the staff in the co-operative shops adopt a bureaucratic or 
'take it or leave it' attitude, then this will antagonise the rural 
people and defeat the whole movement. Regarding the problem of cash 
purchase, the advance purchase system of agricultural produce by 
co-operatives will help solve this to a certain extent. In brief, the 
co-operative organizers will not only have to educate the rural people 
regarding the principles of organizing and managing co-operative shops 
but they will also have to teach them new buying habits.
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5.5.5 Health and Other Services
In Burma, co-operatives are regarded as a vehicle for social 
improvement. The co-operatives are expected to undertake social 
activities when they become financially strong. Some agricultural 
co-operatives have successfully set up dispensaries and local hospitals 
for the rural people in the respective areas. In 1982-83, there were 
544 co-operative dispensaries and 3 local hospital with 1022 doctors 
and 692 nurses, which were run by all types of societies, such as 
township co-operatives, consumers' co-peratives and agricultural 
co-operatives (Central Co-operative Society 1984, p.27). Among them, 
74 dispensaries and 3 local hospitals were run by agricultural 
co-operatives. In addition, some village societies supply electricity 
to domestic consumers in their areas. Figures for 1982-83 show that 15 
societies were supplying electricity to 1482 houses (Central 
Co-operative Society 1984, p.30). Rural electrification is important
not only for higher living standards but also for rural industries. As 
regards education, many societies were major contributors in setting up 
'additional or attached schools’ to the main schools provided for their 
locality. In fact, agricultural co-operatives have been effectively 
supplementing State educational and medical facilities in rural areas. 
Moreover, 467 societies were participating in transportation services 
in 1982-83, especially in ferry transport. In 1982-83 co-operative 
societies owned 273 powered barges and 831 non-powered barges . The 
more the societies succeed in economic enterprises the greater will be 
the social benefits accruing from their profits.
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION
It is clear from the foregoing chapters that Burma is a country 
with a long history of rural co-operatives and with new trends in the 
co-operative movement. The trend has recently been to move from lower 
to higher stages of cooperation - from credit provision to marketing, 
and from marketing to farming activities. The new trends in the
movement created new problems in that the management of supply, 
marketing and consumers' co-operatives is much more difficult than that 
of agricultural credit societies. The latest development is in the 
field of co-operative farming which involves joint efforts in 
cultivation of land leading to pooling of cultivation rights and to 
group farming. This joint management of land poses many psychological 
and operational problems which have to be handled with care and 
patience. Co-operative farming is the most complex type of
co-operative to organize and represents the most advanced stage of 
co-operation. In its full development it embraces every aspect of 
agricultural production and rural life.
Nevertheless, throughout their history, co-operatives have not 
played the special role they could have. The colonial regime had 
destructive effects on the farmers' genuine co-operative spirit and the 
failure of the movement seriously damaged the image of co-operatives. 
Experience has repeatedly shown that whenever a project failed, 
co-operative work in general has been discredited and could not be 
revived for a considerable time. For rural people, the mere profession 
of co-operative principles had little appeal. Principles had to be 
backed by convincing evidence of superior performance.
Under the 1970 Co-operative Scheme, co-operatives have become
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engaged in most aspects of the rural economy and they have made some 
headway in commodity distribution and in providing social services. But 
even with respect to commodity distribution, we have argued that 
success requires that more efforts be put into distributing consumer 
goods over and above those from State outlets. The farmer's ability to 
convert sale proceeds into real income must also be satisfactory. The 
development of industrial producers' co-operatives can support this 
task to a large extent. In fact, combining agriculture with rural 
industry may be one of the most promising developments of agricultural 
co-operatives, especially of co-operative farms. While agriculture 
would remain the principal concern of co-operative farms, they should 
also endeavour to set up and develop rural industries based on local 
resources and manpower as a source of income and employment. Providing 
the industrial products preferred by rural people will also encourage 
farmers to sell more of their crops to the co-operatives. But 
agricultural co-operative societies will require technical guidance and 
assistance for financing cottage industry schemes.
As regards crop procurement, although co-operatives are to support 
the State Economic Enterprises, they should avoid acting as subordinate 
agencies of those enterprises. They must combine service to their 
members and support for the State Economic Enterprises. Essentially, 
they need to rely more on their own initiatives.
With respect to agricultural production, we have seen that 
co-operatives have increased agricultural production by reclamation of 
land and have to some extent improved agricultural practices on the 
farms through the introduction of improved seeds, chemical fertilizers, 
and the practice of green manuring. However, with a few exceptions, 
yields per acre of co-operative farms have not been high enough to 
attract more farmers. As a first step towards the latter, co-operative 
farms need small irrigation works which are both simple in design and 
can be constructed cheaply by sparing use of materials, like cement and 
structural steel, which are in short supply. The precise control of 
water is essential for the spread of high-yielding varieties and for 
greater use of multiple cropping. In addition, co-operative farms could 
very usefully undertake extensive field testing of new techniques. For 
this purpose, they should set aside small plots of land for
91
experimentation. If the experiment is successful, the new technique can 
be profitably adopted; if it fails, the consequences are not
catastrophic. No-one would be heavily dependent for food on the 
outcome of experiments. In co-operatives, the risks of innovation can 
be spread and transfer of technology can be rapid. To increase 
agricultural productivity, technological change as well as structural 
change is necessary. Co-operatives are uniquely placed to exploit the 
benefits of all of these improved agricultural practices.
Unless the benefits of co-operativisation are immediately obvious 
to the rural people, either progress would have to be gradual or a 
certain degree of compulsion would have to be applied. Those who join 
co-operative farms have definite expectations of raising their material 
welfare. If economic success is not forthcoming, rural people will 
remain reluctant to join co-operative farms. The need to achieve 
higher productivity and output are of paramount importance. To do this, 
co-operative farms need to mechanize and increase the absorption of 
modern inputs. But the technology of high yielding varieties with 
intensive use of irrigation water and fertilisers calls for 
considerable amounts of working capital. Co-operative farms will have 
to acquire loans from the government and they themselves will have to 
save at a high rate to finance the major part of their investment 
requirements.
We have argued that the use of improved practices has been 
restrained largely by the unavailability of adequate resources, 
technical guidance and managerial skill. In the societies organized 
around progressive cultivators, i.e cultivators with a high level of 
consciousness and education, improved practices have been more rapidly 
and fully adopted while in the absence of good leadership and where the 
members lacked technical guidance, they continued to use traditional 
techniques. Success seems to depend on the ability and zeal of leaders 
living among the people, leaders who understand their individual needs 
and know how to gain their confidence. All the executive committee 
members of co-operative farms, one-third of whom are nominated by the 
government, should be such local leaders who are well accepted and 
recognized by their people. The initiatives of local leaders who are 
familiar with the particular conditions in the localities should not be
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hampered by central authorities so long as their actions serve the 
general objectives of the movement.
On the other hand, governmental initiative and aid in building the 
co-operative movement is an indispensable instrument of progress, at 
least for the time being. Co-operatives need state help from the start 
to maturity, i.e to the point where they have the motivation and 
material potentialities for self-administration. Since the process of 
transformation from small-scale subsistence farming to co-operative 
farming calls for a change in attitudes there is an urgent necessity 
for planned education and training of members. Education is a
continuing factor in co-operative work and should encourage members to 
regard the co-operative farm as their own property and responsibility. 
It is necessary to foster community feeling and the sense of ownership 
that is essential to the maintenance of enthusiasm and to effect the 
self-discipline without which the scheme would collapse. Co-operative 
farming societies will have to struggle against certain adverse 
psychological reactions to proposals for pooling land. It must be made 
clear to the members that co-operative farms are their own farms, that 
all the equipment and buildings on the farms are theirs, and that the 
harder they work the greater their return.
Creating appropriate incentives in the process of agricultural 
transformation is one of the most important issues. This issue is 
crucial for inducing faster growth in co-operative production, which at 
present accounts for only a small fraction of total agricultural 
output. Since private ownership of land still predominates, it is 
important to find means other than mere moral suasion. There must be a 
proper system of material incentives. For remuneration of labour, the 
piece-rate system is preferable to the time-rate system because the 
defined norms and rewards are more effective in raising the rate of 
attendance and productive efficiency. A major problem of the time-rate 
system is that when it is applied in politically backward 
co-operatives, it is slow and inefficient in motivating individuals to 
undertake collective work to the best of their capacities. Some 
members tend to refuse to undertake heavier and dirtier tasks. A high 
level of consciousness among members is required for successful 
application of the time-rate system. An incentive system must reward
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those who are able to produce more with greater efficiency in relation 
to those who are less productive and less efficient. There must be 
adequate incentives in the form of rewards for differential production 
performance to generate a high enough rate of growth. On the other 
hand, differential rewards should be kept within the limits of 
tolerable income inequality. Norms on the lines of traditional 
standards and prevalent practices in the locality are proper and 
welcome. In a farming society, the allocation of work, assessment of 
performance by each member, and determination of remuneration are of 
utmost importance to the success of the venture.
As an economic organization co-operative farms demand considerable 
managerial skill. Farms of a fairly large size involving crop 
planning, periodic allocation of work, understanding and operation of 
norms, and distribution of wages and profit, can not be managed by 
untrained farmers. It will be necessary to secure a sufficient number 
of agriculturalists with management ability capable of controlling a 
large labour force. More trained personnel are required and training 
for management is an absolute necessity. Training courses to create 
specialized cadres of managers for co-operative farms should be 
undertaken by the Co-operative Department. The co-operative farming 
movement should not fail for lack of trained personnel.
It will also be important for the officers and staff of the 
Co-operative Department to establish more contact with local 
co-operatives. Special officers in charge of co-operative farming 
societies should have considerable acquaintance with the conditions of 
the co-operative farms and sufficient knowledge and experience of 
improved local practices in cultivation. Co-operatives would benefit 
from frequent visits, especially in drawing up their plans for 
production and investment. Auditing of the functions of the society 
should take place more often than annually. All the agencies and 
officers of the other concerned departments are expected to provide 
necessary technical guidance. It is hoped that co-ordination with the 
concerned departments will be successfully carried out through the 
various levels of People's Councils. As regards secondary societies 
such as Township Co-operative Societies, their activities (for example, 
provision of various supplies, transport, packaging, and marketing) 
should support the productive activities of co-operative farms.
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The main prerequisite for effective assistance is the study of the 
feasibility and adaptability of the co-operative farming programme. It 
will be necessary to find out what specific needs exist and are 
recognised by the respective people. Before forming a new society, the 
soil and climatic conditions should be carefully studied and areas 
frequently subjected to floods, droughts and distress should not be 
selected for launching the programme. If lands were to be pooled,- 
lands should be pooled for a minimum period of five years. Withdrawal 
during this period might be allowed only in exceptional circumstances, 
e.g. a member leaving the village. Although feasibility studies are 
costly and time-consuming they may prevent the loss of much more money 
and time on utopian and illusory co-operative farms initiated without 
preparation.
The organization of co-operative farming and its efficient working 
are interrelated. The encouragement of group participation in farming 
activities such as applying fertilizers and spraying pesticides should 
be treated as a preliminary step for the promotion of co-operative 
farming, and the efficient and successful working of the co-operative 
farms will give momentum to the movement. Development of co-operative 
farms will be most effective if carried out step by step. The pace of 
change should not be forced. Success will be more certain if peasants 
are encouraged to form co-operative farms according to the principle of 
voluntariness and mutual benefit. No society should be organized in 
haste and the people should have a real desire and need to form such a 
society. Forcing the pace of co-operativization through intimidation or 
compulsion will not only fail, but could also have disastrous effects 
on agricultural production. Attaining co-operativization gradually by 
convincing farmers of the need for it, is, in the long run, by far the 
most effective policy. In the implementation of the co-operative 
farming programme, emphasis should be on quality. If the quality is 
good, the programme will gather strength, the numbers will multiply and 
the movement will gain momentum. However, if it takes too long to 
organize farmers the movement may lose momentum and stagnation may 
gradually set in. To organize farmers, the co-operative farming 
movement must rely largely on the various levels of the BSPP and the 
peasants' asiayones. Without their help formation of voluntary farming 
societies will be almost impossible.
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APPENDIX A 
TABLES
Table 1: The Twenty Year Plan for the Co-operative Sector
(at 1969-70 constant producers prices, Kyats in million)
Particulars Base Year Plan Target
(1973-74) (1993-94)
Value Percent Value Percent
Production 452 7.7 6678 33.0
Agriculture _ _ 3745 50.0
Livestock 170 23.2 941 50.0
Fishery 17 10.8 195 50.0
Forestry 8 2.8 76 10.0
Mining 3 2.2 24 5.0
Industry 254 19.4 1587 20.0
Power - - 24 5.0
Construction - - 86 10.0
Services 42 1.6 697 9.0
Transportation 5 0.7 280 10.0
Communication - - - -
Financial 1 0.7 18 5.0
Social 18 5.0 188 20.0
Administrative 
Rentals and
— — —
Others 18 2.3 211 10.0
Trade 475 16.7 1895 25.0
External
Wholesale 323 25.2 839 25.0
Retail 152 15.0 1056 40.0
Total Net Output 969 8.5 9270 26.0
Source: U Tin Htun 1982, p.29.
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Table 2: Progress of Agricultural Co-operative Societies
Year Agricultural 
Producers' Co-ops
Village-tract 
Co-ops
Co-operative
Farms
Society Member Society Member Society Member
(No.) (000 ) (No. ) (000 ) (No.) (000 )
1970-71 5 n.a 12557# 4623 - -
1971-72 85 26 11872 4023 - -
1972-73 n.a n.a 12157 4171 - -
1973-74 n .a n . a 12276 4201 - -
1974-75 103 26 12485 4120 - -
1975-76 105 28 12427 4169 - -
1976-77 145 28 12511 4272 - -
1977-78 423* 46 12495 4329 n .a n . a
1978-79 108 23 12524 4386 691 65
1979-80 107 20 12529 4323 883 93
1980-81 10 1 23 12505 4272 914 99
1981-82 98 22 12489 4342 925 94
1982-83 97 22 12505 4347 936 97
1983-84 95 22 125 16 4351 937 97
Notes: #Agricultural and multi-purpose co-operative societies 
formed prior to the 1970 Co-operative Scheme are included. 
*Pilot co-operative farms are included.
Sources: Burma, Various issues of Report to the Pyithu Hluttaw.
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Table 3: Contributions to the Value of Agricultural Net
Output by Ownership, (at 1969 constant 
producers' prices)
Kyat in (000 ) thousands Percentage
Year State Co-op Private Total State Co-op Private
1973-74 37 - 30191 30228 0. 1 - 99.9
1974-75 45 * 29582 29628 0.2 # 99.8
1975-76 48 * 31171 31219 0.2 # 99.8
1976-77 57 25 32982 33064 0.2 0. 1 99.7
1977-78 55 128 34623 34806 0.2 0.4 99.4
1978-79 69 323 37086 37478 0.2 0.9 98.9
1979-80 88 417 38933 39438 0.2 1. 1 98.7
1980-81 109 489 43833 44431 0.2 1 . 1 98.7
1981-82 103 10 17 47197 48317 0.2 2. 1 97.7
1982-83 103 1190 50300 51593 0.2 2.3 97.5
1983-84 174 1379 52535 54088 0.3 2.6 97.1
Notes: * 
#
Sources:
Less
Less
Burma
than one 
than 0.1 
, Various
lakh. 
percent. 
issues of the Report to the Pyithu Hluttaw.
98
Table 4: Agricultural
Activities
Co-operatives 
in 1982-83 by
Undertaking Farming 
State/Division
State/Division Co-op
Farm
Producers'
Co-op
Vi11age-tract 
Co-op
Kachin 28 - 2
Kayah 1 1 7 -
Karen 1 1 - 6
Chin 16 - 9
Sagaing 145 6 67
Tenasserim 14 2 10
Pegu 136 5 156
Magwe 10 1 - 56
Mandalay 142 1 62
Mon 12 - 62
Arakan 106 - 3
Rangoon 33 1 29
Shan 21 - 28
Irrawaddy 124 2 98
Total 900 24 557
Note: There is a slight difference in the number of co-operative 
farms in this table compared with that in Appendix Table 2. 
The figures in this table are provisional while actual in 
Appendix Table 2.
Source: Central Co-operative Society 1984, p.69.
99
Table 5: Value of Production of Various Crops by Co-operatives
1976-77 to 1982-83 (Kyat in thousands, current prices)
Crop 1976-77 1977-78 1978-79 1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83
Paddy 4964 17497 71403 92045 103933 212313 261266
Peanut 1 177 3431 5875 8379 16283 39309 36761
Sesamurn 69 179 2268 921 2380 9199 6292
Mai ze 37 165 123 439 667 1134 1868
Sugarcane 94 200 1 1289 783 1754 2151 1448
Chilli 3 455 82 286 280 209 326
Onion 1 1 300 179 767 217 432 239
Wheat 7 782 863 3994 2744 14510 12353
Soya bean 7 157 1 1 20 43 63 33
Cow pea 1 25 12 47 25 125 82
Chick pea 8 862 727 485 827 3124 3309
Field pea 2 6 8 81 203 70 169
Butter bean 0.2 92 20 10 1 123 362 784
Lima bean 4 77 76 66 133 1271 291
Sunflower 36 189 98 126 665 1182 1288
Jute 8 2 16 1367 3331 4001 1137 599
Fieldbean 0.6 265 12 161 117 378 191
Tobacco 819 1134 2542 1899 258 2043 5200
Black pea - 453 1035 784 1656 789 2565
Redlentil - 8 51 11 27 36 32
Others 162 7371 4242 5834 3571 9909 3876
Total 7409.8 35683 92283 120560 13990 299744 343974
Source: Hlaing, forthcoming
Table 6: Tractors, Water Pumps and Farm Implements
Owned by Co- operative Societies (Number)
Particulars 1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1983-84
Tractors 3731 3755 3785 3787 3813
Disc Plough 3475 3508 3526 3525 3538
Disc Harrow 3634 3660 3686 3691 3714
Rotor Cultivator 8 9 9 8 8
Trailer 961 955 978 985 993
Water Pump 7171 7545 750 1 7426 7433
Power Tiller 161 371 375 376 378
Thresher 51 60 60 61 65
Rice Huller 72 54 54 55 66
Slasher 5 5 5 4 6
Source: Burma 1984, p.51
Table 7: Utilization of Co-operative Tractors, 
1970-71 to 1983-84
Year Tractors Income(Kyat) Tillage Acres
Running Idle Total Total 
(000 )
Per
Tractor
Total 
(000 )
Per
Tractor
1970-71 1488 65 1533 6061 4073 489 328
1971-72 1730 240 1970 9423 5447 766 443
1972-73 2048 447 2495 7855 3835 462 226
1973-74 2110 649 2759 3246 1538 168 80
1974-75 2256 765 3021 5994 2657 346 153
1975-76 220 1 1134 3335 10281 4671 332 151
1976-77 2176 1274 3450 10 193 4684 175 80
1977-78 2248 1322 3570 13758 6120 225 100
1978-79 2205 1503 3708 14587 6615 262 119
1979-80 2251 1480 3731 14916 6626 188 84
1980-81 2256 1498 3754 16326 7237 189 84
1981-82 2388 1397 3785 14856 6221 143 60
1982-83 2468 1319 3787 14104 5715 106 43
1983-84 2257 1556 3813 14782 6549 103 46
Source: Hlaing, forthcoming
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Table 8: Utilization of Co-operative Water-pumps,
1970-71 to 1983-84
Year Water Pumps Income(Kyat) Used Hours
Running Idle Total Total 
(000 )
Per Pump Total 
(000 )
Per Pump
1970-71 866 32 898 211 244 154 177
1971-72 1133 34 1 167 400 353 199 176
1972-73 2144 87 2231 653 305 311 145
1973-74 2795 66 2861 109 39 52 19
1974-75 4250 70 4327 588 138 241 57
1975-76 5027 663 5690 2228 443 925 184
1976-77 5341 920 6261 2765 518 668 125
1977-78 5481 1136 6617 4743 865 1036 189
1978-79 5612 1323 6935 7047 1256 1782 318
1979-80 5692 1479 7171 6940 1219 1632 287
1980-81 5940 1614 7554 5737 966 1024 172
1981-82 n . a n . a 7501 n . a n . a n . a n .a
1982-83 5768 1658 7426 4728 820 663 115
1983-84 n .a n . a 7433 n . a n .a n . a n .a
Sources: Hlaing, forthcoming; Burma 1984, p.51; Central
Co-operative Societty 1984, p.10
Table 9: Comparison of Plan Target and Implementation in
Co-operative Crop Procurement (Kyat in thousands)
Year Plan Target Implementation Percent
1971-72 96279 48310 50. 17
1972-73 830595 360074 43.37
1973-74 1114682 298990 19. 65
1974-75 331601 135616 40.89
1975-76 658567 224559 34.09
1976-77 618469 176788 28.64
1977-78 499450 232596 46.57
1978-79 612934 261044 40.96
1979-80 669895 181258 27.05
1980-81 665653 367523 60.68
1981-82 n .a n .a n .a
1982-83 1036971 396042 38.20
1983-84 n .a n .a n .a
Sources: Hlaing, forthcoming; Central Co- 
Society 1984, pp.134-135.
operative
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Table 10: Co-operative Crop Procurement in 1982-83
(selected major crops)*
Crops Unit Plan Target Procurement
Qty 
(000 )
Value 
K(000 )
Qty 
(000 )
Value 
K(000 )
Percent 
Qty Value
Peanut Basket 16331 575626 5475 188650 33.5 32.8
Sesam urn Basket 2480 229771 756 79625 30.5 34.7
Chilli Viss 2085 23676 407 3686 19. 5 15.6
Onion Viss 5689 6956 457 838 8.0 12. 1
Gram Basket 1199 52133 678 33621 56.5 64.5
Wheat Basket 634 36264 836 49887 123.9 137.6
Paddy Basket 3688 43983 2458 27851 66.7 63.3
Mai ze Basket 18 418 10 236 55.7 56.7
Sunflower Basket 1036 40059 85 3039 8.5 7.6
Note: * Co-operative societies are marketing over twenty kinds 
of crop depending on local production.
Source: Hlaing, forthcoming.
Table 11: Share Capital, Trading Capital and Turnover of 
Village-tract Cooperatives (Kyat in millions)
Year Share Capital Trading Capital Turnover
1970-71 34.3 250.9 728. 9
1971-72 49.7 235.4 729.3
1972-73 55.2 374.6 873.3
1973-74 55.4 379.0 873.5
1974-75 61.2 392.5 966.6
1975-76 65.6 425.4 1450.2
1976-77 69. 1 508. 1 1465.5
1977-78 70.5 563.5 1621.1
1978-79 71.4 588.5 1217.2
1979-80 73.7 617.9 1403.9
1980-81 74.7 713.4 1682.8
1981-82 75.8 753.7 1754.2
1982-83 75.9 761.3 1771.7
1983-84 76.3 776.5 1798.3
Source: Burma 1984, p.184
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